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INTRODUCTION

In December 2002, the European Union adopted the Financial
Conglomerates Directive (Financial Conglomerates Directive or Directive),' which introduced a number of innovations to the overall
regulatory framework applicable to large financial groups active in
Europe. The main concern of the Directive is to ensure that operations at the group level are not conducted to the detriment of specifically regulated subsidiaries, such as banks, broker-dealers and insurance companies. 2 In doing so, the Directive potentially governs the
activities of several foreign financial conglomerates not regulated by
their host countries in a way deemed "equivalent" by the national implementing authority in Europe.3 While the decision on the "equivalence" of a particular regulatory framework belongs to domestic regulatory agencies, the European Financial Conglomerates Committee
and the Banking Advisory Committee have issued general guidance to

1. Council Directive 2002/87, Financial Conglomerates Directive, 2002 O.J. (L
35) [hereinafter Financial Conglomerates Directive] of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 16 December 2002 on the supplementary supervision of credit institutions, insurance undertakings and investment firms in a financial conglomerate
and amending Council Directives 73/239, art. 6, 1973 O.J. SPEC. ED (EEC), 79/267,
art. 6, 1979 O.J. (EEC), 92/49 (EEC), 92/96, 1992 O.J. (ECC) and 93/22, art. 1(2)
EEC, and Directives 98/78, art. l(b)(c), 1998 O.J. and 2000/12 , art. 1(1), 2000 O.J.
(EC) of the European Parliament and of the Council.
2. Id.
3. In a recent speech given at a Conference in Brussels, Clive Briault, a Managing Director of Retail Markets at the British Financial Services Authority (FSA),
pointed out: "[T]here are [fifteen] non-[European Economic Area] conglomerates
with a European presence in which the FSA has a role to play. Indeed, the FSA is
likely to be the Co-ordinating Supervisor for the majority of these." Joint Level 3
Committees Conference (Nov. 24, 2005), availableat http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/
Library/Communication/Speeches/2005/24_cb. shtml.
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help national authorities assess this point. 4 The U.S. and Swiss cases
have, understandably, attracted special attention.' In both cases, however, the conclusions reached by the Committees raise difficult legal
issues, particularly with respect to information exchange. 6 Although
most concerned agencies have started a dialogue on the equivalence of
regulatory frameworks, a clear understanding, including not only the
legal but also the economic and political variables at stake, is of great
importance for both regulators and financial groups.
Largely in response to the Financial Conglomerates Directive, the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted a new regulatory framework providing American financial groups, which until
then were not regulated at the group level, with a concrete way to
avoid regulation by a European agency, 7 particularly the British Financial Services Authority (FSA). 8 This framework is two-fold.
First, the SEC adopted a rule allowing broker-dealer holding companies to voluntarily register with the SEC as "Supervised Investment
Bank Holding Companies" (SIBHC) under some conditions.9 Second,
the commission also adopted a rule, often referred to as the "Consolidated Supervised Entities" (CSEs) rule, tying voluntary submission to
group-level supervision to an advantageous way of computing capital
requirements for broker-dealers. 10 The Swiss authorities have also

4. The only two general guidelines issued so far on this topic concern the
United States and Switzerland: EFCC/BAC General Guidance-USA Supervision,
COM (2004) final (July 6, 2004) [hereinafter General Guidance USA]; EFCC/BAC
General Guidance-Switzerland,COM (2004) final (July 6, 2004) [hereinafter General Guidance Switzerland].

5. General Guidance USA, supra note 4; General Guidance Switzerland, supra
note 4.
6. General Guidance USA, supra note 4, at 4; General Guidance Switzerland,
supra note 4, at 3-4.
7. See SEC Final Rule: Supervised Investment Bank Holding Companies, 69
Fed. Reg. 34,472 (June 21, 2004); Alternative Net Capital Requirements for BrokerDealers that Are Part of Consolidated Supervised Entities, 69 Fed. Reg. 34,428
(June 21, 2004).
8. See Hal S. Scott, An Overview of International Finance: Law and Regulation, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 33 (A.T. Guzman & A.O.

Sykes eds., Edward Elgar Publishing, forthcoming 2006), available in preliminary
form
at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/pifs/pdfs/internationalfinance_
handbook.pdf.
9. See Supervised Investment Bank Holding Companies, 69 Fed. Reg. 34,472.
10. See Alternative Net Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers that Are Part
of Consolidated Supervised Entities, 69 Fed. Reg. 34,428. '
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taken similar steps, again, largely motivated by the need to satisfy the
equivalence standards set forth by the Directive."
These interactions between different jurisdictions offer an interesting set of facts with which to assess the performance of equivalence
as a relevant approach to international financial integration, starting
with the development of a transatlantic capital market. Equivalence is
often conceived of as an alternative to harmonization. 2 Harmonization implies that two or more jurisdictions have come to apply similar
standards. 13 Equivalence refers instead to the idea that two or more
regimes are recognized as suitable for achieving similar regulatory objectives. 14 While from a conceptual standpoint there is a relatively
clear difference between these two approaches, there is still some confusion as to how they relate to one another. One possibility would be
to say that the two are mutually exclusive, but this does not warrant
much support in practice. For instance, if one looks at the current
E.U.-U.S. dialogue on international accounting standards, the equivalence approach is actually being used as a preliminary step towards
harmonization. 5 However, this should not lead to the conclusion that
11. Circulaire de la Commission f6d6rale des banques: Surveillance des
grandes banques du 21 avril 2004 [hereinafter CFB 04/1] [Circular No. 04/1 of the
Swiss Federal Banking Commission of April 21, 2004: Supervision of Large
Banks], Apr. 21, 2004, (Switz.); Loi f6d6rale du 17 d6cembre 2004 sur la surveillance des entreprises d'assurance [hereinafter LSA], [Federal Statute on the Supervision of Insurance Undertakings], Dec. 17, 2004, Recueil systematique du droit
f6d6ral [RS] 961.01 (Switz.) available at http://www.admin.ch/f/rs (adopted on December 17, 2004 and entered into force on January 1, 2006); Loi du 8 novembre
1934 sur les banques et les caisses d'6pargne, [LB], [hereinafter FBA], Nov. 8 1934,
RS 952, Art. 3b to 3h, as amended by LSA.
12. See Scott, supra note 8. There are many conceptual approaches to regulation. Hal Scott makes several distinctions. Id. First, he distinguishes between the
regulation of firms (banks, insurance companies, broker-dealers, groups or conglomerates) and that of transactions (mostly cross-border securities offerings). Id.

He then identifies seven different approaches to the regulation of financial transactions, and only three for the regulation of firms. Id. In this latter case, the altematives are harmonization and equivalence (in two different forms: mutual recognition
of home country rules; and conditional recognition of home country rules combined
with self-protection measures). Id. Although his main focus is the regulation of
cross-border branching by foreign banks, his discussion can be applied mutatis mutandis to the approaches to the regulation of international financial conglomerates.
Id.
13.
14.

Id.
Id.

15.

See HAL S. SCOTT, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, TRANSACTIONS,
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equivalence is not viable as an independent approach. The purpose of
this study is to explore the extent to which equivalence represents an
approach on its own right.
Drawing upon recent developments in the international regulation
of financial conglomerates, this article argues that, at least in some
cases, equivalence is not only a practical alternative to harmonization,
but it may also be a more effective one, for it takes into account the
enforcement dimension and thus better serves the underlying goals of
financial regulation. In particular, equivalence may better accommodate country specificities16 as well as the potential conflicts between
prudential objectives and considerations of competitiveness. By introducing some additional degrees of liberty in the way these two
regulatory goals are reconciled in different jurisdictions, equivalence
may avoid the rigidity inherent to harmonization, for which the level
of enforcement remains the main adjustment mechanism. Of course,
equivalence also entails significant challenges. Above all, one may
wonder who should regulate a financial conglomerate. This question
is relevant not only in cross-border regulation, but also within a system like the American system where several regulatory agencies (for
financial groups, the Federal Reserve Board, the SEC, and state insurance regulators) may assert competence over the same entities. More
generally, equivalence operates in a context strongly influenced by
politics. Whether a particular regulatory regime is considered equivalent or whether further reform is needed may heavily depend upon the
relative bargaining power of the agencies involved. It is therefore important, when dealing with the particular questions that will occupy
the rest of this piece, to keep the political background in mind.
This article is structured into two main sections. The first section
deals with the theoretical and historical rationales for regulating financial entities at the group level, as well as with the issue of enforcement
structures. The basic idea is that equivalence may provide more lee-

AND REGULATION,

ch. 2 § D (12th ed. 2006).

16. See Howell E. Jackson, Variation in the Intensity of FinancialRegulation:
PreliminaryEvidence and Potential Implications, 12-14 (JOHN M. OLIN CTR. FOR
LAW, ECON. & Bus., HARVARD LAW SCH., Discussion Paper No. 521, Aug. 2005).

Jackson identifies six main types of country specificities that may hinder the effectiveness of regulations imported from foreign jurisdictions: differences in scale of
the country; differences in composition and sophistication of the financial services
industry; differences in regulatory objectives; different national endowments; different levels of enforcement intensity; and different levels of lawlessness of the population. Id.
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way to domestic rule-makers for striking a balance that takes into account both conflicting policy goals and country specificities. These
theoretical foundations provide the basis for a discussion, in the second section, of three concrete regulatory regimes of financial groups,
namely those of the United States, the European Union and Switzerland. This article then analyzes how the equivalence approach is
shaping the international regulation of financial groups, paying particular attention to the question of information exchange, which appears to be one of the main hurdles, not only for group-level regulation, but also, and more generally, for international regulatory
cooperation as a whole.
I. WHY ARE FINANCIAL GROUPS REGULATED?

A. General Remarks
The activities of financial groups are regulated both at domestic
and international levels. While there appears to be a consensus on the
necessity of regulation, national authorities have only recently started
to realize the importance of drawing an international level playing
field. Twenty years ago, the then Governor of the Bank of England,
Robin Leigh-Pemberton, acknowledged "on an international scale cooperation between securities regulators on matters such as capital adequacy and coordination between banking and securities supervisors
[did] not exist to any useful extent." 7 Less than a year ago, Commissioner Glassman from the SEC expressed the opposite view, that
"[t]he U.S.-E.U. Dialogue has been very successful in establishing a
cooperative forum in which concerns or regulatory conflicts can be
raised and addressed early on so as to improve understanding and help
smooth implementation of regulation for issuers and intermediaries
operating on both sides of the Atlantic."18

17. Robin Leigh-Pemberton, Speech to the Group of Thirty Symposium on
Equity Markets, London (Sept. 15, 1986), cited in Richard Dale, International Financial Regulation, in THE AGE OF REGULATORY REFORM 219 (Kenneth Button &
Dennis Swann eds., 1989).
18. Cynthia A. Glassman, Commissioner, SEC, Remarks before the Center for
the Study of International Business Law Breakfast Roundtable Series, (Oct. 7,
2005), available at www.sec.gov/news/speech/spchl00705cag.htm (last visited
Nov. 21, 2006).
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Why national authorities have been progressively led throughout
the last two decades to fundamentally change the underlying basis
upon which international banking and financial transactions are regulated is a question that can be approached from a variety of perspectives. In what follows, there are two issues of particular importance
for the regulation of international financial conglomerates. The first
concerns the underlying justifications for regulating these conglomerates, as well as the particular features of these groups that prevent
conventional regulatory techniques, such as capital regulation, from
being totally effective. The second refers to different structures that
can be used to enforce the corresponding regulations. The very idea
of international financial conglomeration, which involves activities
transcending both sectorial and national boundaries, raises difficult
questions as to who should be the regulator and how this regulator
should operate. These two issues will be dealt with in separate sections. In a third section, the article will discuss how these issues arise
in the context of the recent measures to regulate international financial
groups. The main point of the overall discussion is to identify the type
of problems that any attempt at regulating financial groups at the international level will need to address, and more specifically, to explore
the strengths of equivalence in this context.
B. Rationalesfor RegulatingInternationalFinancialGroups
Regulation 9 in the banking and financial sectors is based mainly
on two broad and closely related considerations: managing risk while
ensuring competition. 0 Concerning the first, a distinction is usually
drawn between the risks for depositors/investors 2' and those for the
19.

The academic literature on "regulation" developed from the 1970s onward,

focusing principally on a variety of "market failures" most often related to issues of
competition and distribution. For a useful overview of the foundational literature
dealing with regulation from the economic, legal, and political science perspectives

see the classic work of DANIEL F. SPULBER, REGULATION AND MARKETS, 21-69
(1989).
20. There are, of course, some other justifications that could be advanced, such
as redistributive policies or paternalistic arguments. However, risk-management and
competition are the two most relevant, at least for the purposes of analyzing the
foundations of group-level regulation.
21. In a classic article published in the Yale Law Journal,Robert Clark identifies five possible reasons for granting special protection to "suppliers of capital."
Robert C. Clark, The Soundness of FinancialIntermediaries,86 YALE L.J. 1, 12-22

(1976). First, Clark points to a number of empirical studies suggesting that it may
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economy as a whole,22 the basic point being that actions that may
harm depositors or investors do not necessarily threaten the whole
economy. 23 As to the competition rationale, risk-regulation clearly

impacts the strategies available to financial intermediaries to compete
in the market, which in turn fosters regulatory arbitrage either across
sectors 24 or across domestic/national boundaries. Thus, the purpose of
regulation is not only to avoid monopolies, but also to establish a level
playing field for financial intermediaries subject to different regulabe easier for insiders to steal from financial intermediaries than from ordinary corporations. Id. at 12-13. Second, absent regulation, financial intermediaries could
change their level of risk much faster than what a regular corporation could do, making depositors/investors bear the cost of the increased risk. Id. at 14-15. Clark argues, in particular, that financial institutions are especially prone to excessive risktaking. Id. at 15-18. Third, the costs of information regarding the risks involved
with alternative investments in financial intermediaries may be too high for some
depositors/investors to place their funds efficiently. Id. Fourth, and in a similar
vein, fund suppliers may simply be unable to make economically wise choices when
allocating their funds. Id. at 18-21. Finally, small investors may require more comprehensive protection than wealthier or more sophisticated ones, given their relatively larger dependence upon the funds deposited/invested for their everyday life.
Id. at 21-22. Clark himself did not take these arguments for granted. See generally
id. They are still recurrent enough in the literature not to be neglected. This is particularly the case for the securities industry, where the emphasis is not so much on
the potential dangers that may derive from the failure of broker-dealers but rather on
the need for investors to be protected against fraudulent practices.
22. See id. at 10-11.
23. Beyond the protection of a particular group of the population, the critical
role of financial intermediation for the functioning of the economy as a whole provides an additional argument for regulating the activities of intermediaries. See
HOWELL E. JACKSON & EDWARD SYMONS, REGULATION OF FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS 7 (1989). This is usually referred to as the "systemic risk" rationale
for regulation. Id. The idea is that, aside from the social losses a bank failure would
cause, such as the cost for either the deposit insurance fund or the state welfare system, a disruption in financial intermediation would entail "systemic costs," such as
"irrational bank runs ...

problems in clearing systems, disruption of capital under-

writing, and unexpected contractions of the money supply." Id.
24. Generally speaking, the literature in the United States has distinguished
four specific sectors: depository institutions, insurance companies, broker-dealers,
and investment companies and their advisers. Other jurisdictions have different
categories, particularly in those countries where banks have traditionally been allowed to be fully engaged in underwriting and dealing in securities. But let us leave
aside, for the time being, this complexity and focus simply on the existence of a
number of specific sectors. These sectors are characterized by the fact that a single
common regulatory approach would govern their operations.
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tory frameworks to compete fairly.2 5 One point that is critical to this
analysis is that these two main rationales may, under some circumstances, conflict with one another. Indeed, a level playing field can be
created either by introducing additional regulation or by removing part
of the existing one. However, insofar as the existing regulation tends
to ensure a given prudential threshold, removal may not be an easy
option, for it may jeopardize the overall financial system. Conversely,
a stringent regulatory framework may impair the competitiveness of
those financial intermediaries subject to it. This point must be kept in
mind when discussing the specific rationales for which financial conglomerates require particular forms of regulation. Overall, the same
two major rationales apply, but with important adjustments reflecting

the structure and activities of these entities.
This article first focuses on prudential considerations. In an important article written in 1994, Howell Jackson retraces the trend towards enhanced obligations imposed on financial groups. 26 Jackson
identifies two main justifications that have been advanced in practice
to legitimize enhanced obligations on groups.27 First, holding companies would be particularly prone to prey on their controlled subsidiar28
ies, thus increasing the level of risk of controlled intermediaries.
Jackson calls this the "hungry wolf' hypothesis. 29 From the doctrinal
point of view, this rationale is implicit in the well-known "source-ofstrength" doctrine, which holds that parent companies should represent a source of financial and managerial strength for their subsidiaries.30 Second, according to what Jackson refers to as the "regulatory
25. See generally SPULBER, supra note 19.
26. Howell E. Jackson, The Expanding Obligations of Financial Holding
Companies, 107 HARv. L. REv. 509 (1994) [hereinafter Jackson, Expanding Obligations]. The piece does not deal with investment bank holding companies, for they
were not regulated at the time. See also Howell E.Jackson, Regulation of a Multisectored FinancialServices Industry: An Exploratory Essay, 77 WASH. U. L.Q.
319 (1999).
27. Jackson, Expanding obligations,supra note 26, at 512.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. According to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Board, the
main regulator of financial holding companies, in the absence of this doctrine there
would be "an incentive for holding companies to maximize the short-term, cyclical
profits of their subsidiary banks, regardless of risk, because the bank insurance
fund-not the parent holding companies - would ultimately bear the costs if the
subsidiaries later failed." Petition for Certiorari at 17, Board of Governors v.
Mcorp., 502 U.S. 32 (1991) (Nos. 90-913 & 90-914), cited in Jackson, The Expand-
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deterioration" hypothesis, group-level regulation would help fill the
regulatory gaps in traditional forms of regulation, making the holding
company responsible for excessive risk-taking by its subsidiaries. 3 ' In
other words, regulation at the group level would help harness moral
hazard at the subsidiary level. 32 Jackson has recently taken up these
ideas refining them in a chapter dealing with group-level regulation
from the specific perspective of capital requirements. 33 Capital requirements, which constitute probably the main technique for the prudential regulation of groups, are not easily applied to financial conglomerates. 34 The specific features of financial conglomeration would
make the need for capital regulation ambiguous. In this respect, Jackson discusses the various technical weaknesses of entity-level capital
ing Obligations of Financial Holding Companies, supra note 26, at 562 n.194.

Jackson concludes that the "hungry wolf' hypothesis is unwarranted. Id. at 566-67.
He reviews two sets of studies. The first only supports the idea that the portfolios of
affiliated institutions tend to differ considerably from those of unaffiliated ones. Id.
at 573-74. The second set is far more conclusive. It asks whether affiliation with a
holding company is related with bank failures. The findings suggest that affiliation
is negatively correlated with bank insolvency. Id. at 574-76. As to the "regulatory
deterioration" hypothesis, see Jackson, Expanding obligations, supra note 26. Jackson's
conclusions are mostly based on a previous study he conducted on the performance
of 175 thrifts. This study suggests that the impact of group regulation on the thrift
industry is positively correlated with the operational performance of affiliated
thrifts. See id. at 573, 577. A recent staff report of the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York points in the same direction. ALLEN B. ASHCRAFT, ARE BANK HOLDING
COMPANIES A SOURCE OF STRENGTH TO THEIR BANKING AFFILIATES? (Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports, no. 189) (June 2004). Using data on the financial condition of insured commercial banks between 1986 and 1999, the study
finds that banks affiliated with multi-bank holding companies are significantly safer
than non-affiliated ones. Id. Moreover, and this is important for purposes of reconciling this study with those cited by Jackson, the analysis suggests that the positive
effect of affiliation was not clearly present before 1989, when the Financial Institutions Reform Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) was passed. See id.
31. Jackson, Expanding obligations,supra note 26.
32. Jackson points also to politics as an additional rationale that explains enhanced group regulation: "The government has gone after holding companies for the
same reason that bank robbers go after banks-that's where the money is .... The

alternative - passing the costs along either to taxpayers or to public claimants on financial institutions, such as depositors or pensioners-has obvious and significant
political costs." Id. at 559.
33. Howell E. Jackson, Consolidated Capital Regulation for Financial Conglomerates, in CAPITAL ADEQUACY BEYOND BASEL: BANKING, SECURITIES AND
INSURANCE 123-45 (Hal S. Scott ed., 2005).
34. See id.
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regulation,3 5 the unique risks associated with financial conglomerates,3 6 the diversification benefits associated with financial conglomeration,37 and internal risk management techniques.38 Admittedly, as
35. See id. at 125-26. Three main weaknesses are identified. First is the issue
of "excessive leverage." Id. A holding company may finance the capital of its regulated subsidiaries by issuing bonds and then, in times of financial stress, withdraw
this capital or force its subsidiaries to make uneconomical moves. Id. Second is the
"double or multiple gearing" practice by which a holding company uses the same
assets to meet both its own capital requirements and those of its subsidiaries. Id.
Third, unregulated affiliates may pose a particular threat to the overall group, a risk
which is not covered by a corresponding increase in the capital held by the group.
Id. These issues could be subsumed under what Jackson calls, in his other contribution, the "hungry wolf' hypothesis. See Jackson, supra note 26. This hypothesis
would favor more capital requirements.
36. Here, Jackson points to the greater systemic risk created by the size and
complexity of some financial conglomerates to the reputational risk these groups
undergo if one subsidiary falls in disgrace as well as the already mentioned "hungry
wolf' argument, according to which financial conglomerates are more prone to exploit their subsidiaries. See Jackson, supra note 33, at 126-27. This hypothesis
would also favor more capital requirements.
37. Jackson cites a study according to which the optimal level of capital necessary to support a diversified group at a given level of insolvency is lower than the
one required at this same level of insolvency to support a stand-alone entity. See
Andrew Kuritzkes, Til Schuermann, Scott Weiner, Risk Measurement, Risk Management, and Capital Adequacy in Financial Conglomerates, in BROOKINGSWHARTON PAPERS ON FINANCIAL SERVICES 141-93 (Robert Litan & Richard Herring eds., 2003), cited in Jackson, supra note 32, at 127. This would stand for lower
capital requirements. Several studies focusing on the effects of restricting the diversification of bank activities suggest that such restrictions tend to yield negative results, particularly regarding banking-sector efficiency or even the probability of
banking crises. See James R. Barth, Gerard Caprio Jr., and Ross Levine, Banking
Systems around the Globe: Do Regulations and Ownership Affect Performanceand
Stability?, in PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION: WHAT WORKS AND WHAT DOESN'T 31-88
(Frederic Mishkin eds., 2001) and the studies cited therein. A more recent study expands and refines this conclusion finding that restrictions on diversification are negatively related to bank development and positively related to the likelihood of crises.
See James R. Barth, Gerard Caprio Jr., and Ross Levine, Bank Regulation and Supervision: What Works Best?, 13 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION, 205-48 (2004).
38. In practice, indeed, the top managers of financial groups are deeply concerned with the overall risk profile of the group and usually implement detailed risk
management systems affecting the whole economic entity of the group. The conclusions to be derived from this as to whether higher or lower capital requirements are
desirable are ambiguous. As Hal Scott points out:
[f]irms determining economic capital-only on a consolidated basisimplicitly assume that there are no organizational boundaries between firm
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Jackson points out, "[e]xperts may differ over the importance of the
various justifications for consolidated capital oversight, but collectively the arguments in favor of extending capital oversight to financial conglomerates present a compelling case for some sort of consolidated capital supervision."39 This conclusion does not necessarily take
into account that, as discussed before, increased capital requirements
also represent a competitive disadvantage for internationally active
groups. This leads to the second major rationale for regulating financial conglomerates.
Considerations of competitiveness also present some ambiguities
when it comes to deciding whether they stand for more or less regulation. The competition rationale has two dimensions. The first dimension is concerned with preventing the development of anti-competitive
practices. As one competent observer noted several years ago,
"[f]inancial holding company systems .. . may be formed to accomplish or facilitate anticompetitive practices, such as tie-ins, reciprocal
dealing, predatory pricing, and the elimination of potential competition."40 In practice, however, the need for stricter standards in the financial area has yet to be demonstrated.41 Moreover, even if this need
units; it is all for one and one for all. Regulators would never permit this because, in effect, it requires cross-guarantees among all the units in the banking
organization. Bank regulators would not permit the bank to extend such guarantees.
See CAPITAL ADEQUACY BEYOND BASEL, supra note 33, at 11.

39. See Jackson, supra note 33, at 128.
40. Robert Charles Clark, The Regulation of FinancialHolding Companies, 92
HARV. L. REv. 789, 826 (1979).
41. Id. at 836. In this regard, a recent report of the Group of Ten provides
some evidence regarding the anticompetitive effects of consolidation in the financial
sector. See Group of Ten, Report on Consolidation in the FinancialSector, January
2001, available at www.bis.org/publlgten05.pdf [hereinafter Report on Consolidation in the Financial Center]. As far as retail banking is concerned, higher concentration tends to lead to less favorable conditions for small business loans, retail deposits, and payment services. Id. A first set of studies compares markets with
different degrees of concentration at a given point in time. Id. at 271-72. The report
also mentions that this evidence is less strong for studies based on 1990s data, and
that, in at least one case, increased competition has not been offset by the higher
concentration. Id. A second set of studies, focusing on the markets that have experienced consolidation, confirms the idea that this phenomenon affects prices. Id.
The anticompetitive effect is also noticeable in the investment bank industry, although there are very few studies on this issue. Id. at 272-73; see also Hsuan-Chi
Chen & Jay R. Ritter, The Seven Percent Solution, 55 J.FIN. 1105 (2000). However, this evidence is not in itself enough to justify stricter antitrust standards.
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could be empirically established, the relation between financial stability and antitrust would still remain ambiguous, as too much competition may lead disadvantaged companies to adopt increasingly risky
strategies.42 Thus, too much competition may be as bad as too little.
In this context, regulation would appear as a tool to strike a satisfactory balance between two undesirable extremes. The question is how
much regulation? Adding to the ambiguities so far reviewed, the second dimension of the competition argument further suggests that too
much regulation may not only be bad for prudential purposes but also
for the international competitiveness of national companies. This article has already referred to the possible tension between prudential and
competitiveness questions. This tension is particularly acute at the international level in which financial groups operate. a3 As a matter of
fact, the competition rationale may lead to opposite conclusions according to whether it is viewed from the domestic or the international
perspective. Many examples of this can be given. For instance, at
least one scholar has argued that the adoption of the Foreign Bank Supervision Enhancement Act of 1991 (FBSEA), which introduced new
limitations on foreign bank state-chartered branches, did not only seek
to enhance prudential standards but also had the purpose of establishing a level playing field with federal branches.'
Perhaps the most
well-known illustration of this issue is the U.S. claim that Japanese
banks had a competitive advantage over U.S.-regulated banks because
of the lower capital requirements prevailing in Japan.4 5 As demonstrated later, the SIBHC and CSE frameworks can also be seen as
graduated responses to circumstances in which prudential and competitiveness considerations point in different directions.

42. The Group of Ten report notes:
For the financial sector there might be instances in which competition may
have a negative impact on stability, as the least efficient firms may have an incentive to increase their risk in order to reach the industry profitability level
(the so-called incentive to "gamble for resurrection"). If these firms are large,
financial stability may be threatened.
Report on Consolidationin the Financial Sector, supra note 41, at 267 and gener-

ally ch. 3.
43. See SCOTT, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, supra note 15, ch. 3, § C.2.f.
44. Id.
45. See Dale, supra note 17, at 218-19. This was one of the major drivers leading to the adoption of the Basel I capital standards in July 1988. Id. However, as
discussed later, the development of a level playing field may require more than mere
harmonization of regulatory standards.
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The preceding remarks are intended to show how ambiguous the
rationales underlying the regulation of international financial conglomerates may be. In this context, the possibility to tailor the regulatory approach to the specific conditions in a given country would represent an advantage. 4 This possibility provides one argument in favor
of equivalence as an overall approach to international financial integration. Indeed, while a harmonized set of standards would leave little room for adjustment to country and policy specificities, different
but equivalent strategies would leave more room to maneuver. Moreover, as demonstrated in the next section, the little leeway left by a
harmonized set of standards may lead to "covert adjustment" practices, particularly those which may lower the level of enforcement to
favor home country firms.
C. Enforcement Structures
The issue discussed in this section counters one of the usual assumptions of the efforts towards the harmonization of international
regulatory standards, namely that similar rules produce similar effects.

46. A wide range of different techniques can and have been used over time to
attain substantially similar goals. A hypothetical list of the most traditional ones
would include, among others: initial and subsequent capital requirements; licensing
procedures for entry, limitation on the line of business and geographical expansion;
regulation of product prices; imposition of special fiduciary duties; subjection to
various forms of examinations; reporting requirements; restraints on the use and
valuation of assets; restraints on the nature, amount, and valuation of liabilities; liquidity reserves; deposit or account insurance; special conflict of interest rules; depositor preference provisions; special insolvency procedures; and many others. See
Clark, supra note 21, at 10 n.36. More recently, practitioners and analysts have emphasized the potential of "market disciplines" as an efficient way of monitoring financial institutions in countries with well developed financial markets. The term
"market disciplines" usually refers to the incentives for sound risk practices imposed
on financial intermediaries by investors, particularly through an increase in the cost
of funding, access to liquidity, and market perception. For a discussion on this issue
see Geof Mortlock, Strengthening Market Disciplines in the Financial Sector, 65
No. 3 RESERVE BANK OF NEW ZEALAND BULLETIN 38-55 (2002); Hal S. Scott, Market Discipline for Financial Institutions and Sovereigns, in MARKET DISCIPLINE
ACROSS COUNTRIES AND INDUSTRIES 69, 69-77 (Claudio Borio et al. eds., 2004).
For a concrete initiative, see the detailed proposal for optimal bank capital regulation issued by the U.S. Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee on March 2, 2000
calling for increased reliance on subordinated debt as a regulatory tool. STAFF OF
THE

U.S.

SHADOW

FIN.

REGULATION

COMM,

REFORMING

BANK

CAPITAL

REGULATION (2000).
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Among the many reasons why such an assumption seems inaccurate is
the fact that similar rules may be unevenly enforced by different regulatory agencies. Neglecting the enforcement stage 47 of rule implementation may jeopardize not only the establishment of an international
level playing field48 but also the pursuit of a minimum prudential
level. 49 The divergence in enforcement levels gives particular importance to the question of who should be the supervisor of an international financial conglomerate or, in other words, what is the best enforcement structure.
From a conceptual perspective, one can organize the different
types of enforcement structures along two axes. The first axis concerns the subject-matter of the regulation and goes from an integrated
regulatory structure to a functionally separated one. The second axis
focuses instead on the number of regulators intervening and goes from
47. The expression "enforcement stage" is intended to cover not only formal
steps, such as the transposition of directives in the European Framework or the implementation of international standards by domestic legislation, but also informal
practices that give teeth to black letter law. This latter point has seldom been addressed officially, perhaps because casting doubt on the will of foreign regulators to
actually apply standards is politically sensitive. For a study of enforcement levels
see Jackson, supra note 16, at 14-29.
48. This is, in fact, probably the major problem affecting international standard
setting. As Mario Giovanoli, the former General Counsel of the Bank for International Settlement, put it: "The questions arising in connection with the implementation of international soft law standards within domestic jurisdictions and at the international level clearly show that this issue is the Achilles' heel of such standards."
Mario Giovanoli, A New Architecture for the Global FinancialMarket: Legal Aspects of International Financial Standards, in INTERNATIONAL MONETARY LAW
ISSUES FOR THE NEW MILLENIUM 45, 45 (Mario Giovanioli ed., Oxford University

Press 2000). International regulatory harmonization is the most common approach
to the development of an international level playing field for competition. However,
this does not mean that, through harmonizing some regulatory requirements, the
competition-related problems affecting groups subject to different frameworks are
automatically solved. See Hal S. Scott & Shinsaku Iwahara, In Search of a Level
Playing Field: The Implementation of the Basel Capital Accord in Japan and the
United States, GROUP OF THIRTY OCCASIONAL PAPER, no. 46 (1994).
49. One of the components of the Barings failure in 1995, according to a report
of the U.K. House of Commons Treasury Committee, was that the Bank of England,
Barings' lead supervisor, served as supervisor and promoter of London as a financial
center at the same time. The report of the Bank of England on this crisis acknowledged that some "informal concessions" had been made to Barings in the form of
not enforcing a lending limits rule. See SCOTT, supra note 15, ch. 14 § E.4. Similar
claims have been made regarding the poor supervision of banks that led Japan to the
so-caled "lost decade."
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a single regulator structure to one characterized by the coexistence of
multiple regulatory agencies. Although the idea of a single regulator
may seem similar to that of an integrated one, the two are distinct. A
single regulator may have jurisdiction over only a specific functional
area, while an integrated regulator may participate in a collegial structure overseeing an internationally active financial conglomerate. The
four theoretical extremes can thus be represented as follows:
EXHIBIT 1
SINGLE REGULATOR

INTEGRATED
REGULATOR

FUNCTIONAL
REGULATOR

MULTIILE REGULATORS

One could use these two axes to conceptually map the different
institutional alternatives. For instance, looking exclusively at the
United Kingdom, the FSA would operate as both a single and an integrated regulator, thus being located at the upper-left comer. However,
considered from the European perspective, the FSA would be only
one of the regulators involved in the oversight of a financial conglomerate,5" thus belonging to the lower-left quadrant. Conversely, the
U.S. banking regulatory structure, which is characterized by the coexistence of several functional regulators such as the Comptroller of the
50. The framework of reference does not need to be the European Union. For
instance, the Hong Kong Shanghai Bank Corporation (HSBC) is overseen by a college of regulators headed by the FSA, also including regulators from the United
States, France, Switzerland, Canada and Hong Kong. See generally ScoTr, supra

note 15, ch. 2.
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Currency, the Federal Reserve Board, the FDIC and state authorities,
would be located in the lower-right quadrant. The Federal Reserve
Board alone, as the single functional regulator of bank holding companies, would be placed at the upper-right quadrant. Beyond these
relatively clear-cut illustrations one may also encounter more hybrid
forms such as "coordinators,"5 "lead supervisors, '"52 or "collegial supervisors,"53 all involving some degree of collegiality and/or functionality.
There has been considerable controversy as to what is the most
suitable enforcement structure for international financial conglomerates. There are many possible alternatives. One author, for instance,
has argued that harmonization should eventually lead to the establishment of a single regulator responsible for the international enforcement of a given set of standards.54 While this alternative remains
theoretically possible in the distant future, in the short to medium
terms country specificities as well as the still very strong national susceptibilities make such an alternative extremely difficult. If, instead
of harmonization, equivalence is used as the underlying approach towards integration, one would expect to have some form of collegial
regulatory structure heavily dependent upon international cooperation.
Broadly speaking, regulators seem to favor this latter enforcement
structure, although they recognize it may be more easily proposed
than implemented. In this regard, Sir Callum McCarthy, the head of
the British FSA, has warned against the many complexities that are
left in the dark by proponents of the "lead supervisor" model." 5
McCarthy gives two main reasons why this model is problematic.
First, he points to the fact that the regulator of the parent company
may be unwilling or unable to supervise the worldwide activities of
51. This modality has been introduced by the Financial Conglomerates Directive, as we will see later on.
52. See European Financial Services Roundtable, On the Lead Supervisor
Model and the Future of FinancialSupervision in the E. U. (June 2005), availableat
http://www.efr.be/members/upload/news/22676EFRIsvfinal-June2005.pdf (last visited Nov. 25, 2006).
53. One example of a collegial supervisor was that established to oversee (unsuccessfully) the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI). See infra

note 57.
54. See SCOTT, supra note 15.
55. Sir Callum McCarthy, Chairman, Financial Services Authority, How
Should InternationalFinancialService Companies Be Regulated? (Sept. 22, 2004),
available
at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/Library/Communication/Speeches/

2004/SP196.shtml (last visited Nov. 25, 2006).
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the group. 56 The usual example in this respect is the Bank of Credit
and Commerce International (BCCI) case, where the Luxembourg supervisor had, indeed, been unable to detect the manipulations through
which BCCI had artificially been perceived as solvent. 7 Second, a
single regulator can hardly be aware of the specific features and needs
of foreign jurisdictions.58 The alternative model advanced by
McCarthy would consist of some sort of "college of regulators" in
which the lead would not pertain to the parent company's home regulator but rather to the supervisory authority where the group has its
main activities.5 9 The "lead supervisor" model remains, nevertheless,
an attractive alternative to the eyes of other observers and policy makers, at least within the European space.
The two ideas, namely that of a "lead supervisor" and that of "college of supervisors," are not entirely incompatible. In fact, their main
difference concerns the question of who should lead the college and
the extent to which the leader's view should prevail. As a recent policy paper put it:
[T]he establishment of the lead supervisor would be complemented
by the setting-up of a so-called "college of supervisors," which, in
normal circumstances, would include at a minimum representatives
of the supervisory authorities of those countries where the institution has substantial operations; however, to the extent an E.U. supervisor does not want to participate in the college of supervisors,

56. Id. paras. 11-12.
57. See ScoTT, supra note 15; see also Hal S. Scott, Supervision of Interna-

tional Banking Post-BCCI, 8 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 487,487-509 (1992). BCCI, an unregulated holding company based in Luxembourg, was the parent of two banks, one
incorporated in Luxembourg and the other in the Cayman Islands. Id. at 492. Each
of these two banks had subsidiaries, branches, and agencies in sixty-nine countries,
and their principal operations were outside of their nominal home countries. Id.
The failure of BCCI led both international bodies and national supervisors to
strengthen the regulatory framework applicable to international financial groups. Id.
at 500. Some of the principles already present in the Basel Concordat were upgraded to the level of minimum standards. Id.
58. It is helpful to recall here the type of specificities inventoried by Jackson,
such as differences in scale or size of the country, differences in composition and
sophistication of the financial services industry, differences in regulatory objectives,
different national endowments, different levels of enforcement intensity, and different levels of lawlessness of population. See Jackson, supra note 16, at 12-14.
59. See McCarthy, supra note 55, para. 21.
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such supervisor would not be exonerated from implementing the
decisions of the E.U. lead supervisor.6°
More importantly:
In a crisis situation, the college of supervisor [sic] would need to
change in character. Whatever structure is chosen for the college in
times of crisis ... the lead supervisor would continue to have a spe-

cial role amongst supervisors, in particular as regards the coordination of the crisis management efforts... [and] a core of the college
would become a management team for the group of supervisory au61
thorities ....
These different alternatives are interesting insofar as they illustrate the ambiguous relationship between standards and enforcement
as well as the underlying issue of mutual trust among countries. Trust
is indeed important for both harmonization and equivalence. In his
aforementioned speech, Sir Callum McCarthy pointed to "the
fraternity of central bankers and regulators.., the mutual trust, shared
vision, confidence and consciousness of mutual dependence-as well
as of conflicts of interest-which exists [sic] among central bankers
and, where they are different, financial supervisors. 62 While such
trust may indeed exist, it does not embrace every single regulator of
the world, and, as this article will discuss next, even among brothers
trust is limited.
D. Mapping Ambiguities
The preceding discussion provides the theoretical background
necessary for an examination of how the issues reviewed arise in the
context of the recent developments in the regulation of international
financial conglomerates.
One should note that, in this area, prudential requirements and
considerations of competitiveness often point in different directions.
On the one hand, one could expect that the increasingly international
activities of financial groups translate into more competition within
domestic markets. Moreover, the more a regulatory framework seems
favorable to foreign banks, the more these banks will tend to come
under its jurisdiction. Thus, at least at the theoretical level, there
should be some deregulation. However, things may be different in
60. European Financial Services Roundtable, supra note 52, para. 25.
61. Id. para. 29.
62. See McCarthy, supra note 55, para. 7.
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practice. Two main arguments suggest that considerations of competitiveness may in fact have the opposite effect.63 First, prudential considerations may impose limits on deregulation. Second, as risk considerations set the bottom line for the activities of financial groups,
prudential regulation may translate into a competitive disadvantage for
financial groups based in more demanding jurisdictions, as opposed to
groups subject to more liberal regimes. This article has already mentioned how the Basel capital standards were largely nurtured by the
U.S. attempt to subject Japanese64banks to similar capital requirements
as those imposed on U.S. banks.
However, harmonizing standards may not be enough to establish a
level playing field. As mentioned before, it has been argued that much
more than the mere harmonization of capital standards is needed to actually eliminate competitive disparities. Such disparities will remain
unless many other issues are also addressed, such as accounting and
tax rules, government support, rules on activities restrictions, and
above all, that the most concerned regulators commit themselves to a
comparable level of enforcement. 66 And even if a similar level of enforcement was achievable, it would not always be desirable from a
competitive perspective. Regulators may well seek to foster the international competitiveness of their national groups by being more "tolerant" with them. This would risk introducing a sort of covert competition policy, all the more insidious that standards would be formally
the same. This is precisely the type of scenario where equivalence
may be an interesting alternative.
The emerging regulation of non-bank financial conglomerates offers a good illustration of why this may be so. Traditionally, the banking and securities businesses were separated in the United States and
Japan.67 Until very recently, only holding companies possessing
63. In practice, it is also suggested that the main issue is not "what is in the
regulation" but "what is the regulation." In other words, the concern with the contents of a particular regulation would appear to be secondary if internationally active
financial conglomerates could choose to be subject to only one set of standards, even
if not very favorable. This is, of course, hard to evaluate. It would all come to a
matter of degree. How far can a regime go in imposing obligations on financial
conglomerates before they start fishing for most favorable jurisdictions again?
64. See Scott & Iwahara, supra note 48.
65. See Clark, supra note 40.
66. See Scott & Iwahara, supra note 48.
67. The most notable divide among countries until very recently came indeed
from what has commonly been termed "the separation theme," so named because
the business of banking must be separated from insurance and/or securities activi-
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banks were subject to supervision in the United States. This was at
odds with the European system where "universal banks" were allowed
to engage in both banking and securities dealing. Investment bank
holding companies thus benefited from a considerable competitive advantage over both U.S. bank/financial holding companies and European universal banks. The Capital Adequacy Directive now requires
these investment bank groups to be subject to equivalent regulation.68
While the justification given to introduce this measure rested on prudential considerations, the fact that broker-dealers are often seen as
not presenting the same systemic risks as banks suggests that there is
another plausible rationale for this enhanced regulation, and that is to
ties. Clark circumscribes this theme as follows: "regulation sharply limits the ways
in which financial-intermediary activities proper, that is, banking and insurance,
may be connected to other activities." Clark, supra note 40, at 789-90. Richard
Dale focuses on the separation between banking and securities and identifies three
arguments for it:
[F]irst, that securities business is more risky than ordinary commercial
banking and can thereby threaten banking insolvencies; second, that the
mixing of banking and securities involves conflicts of interest that can
lead to widespread abuses; and finally, that these potentially damaging
consequences of mixed banking can be avoided only by prohibiting banks
from engaging in certain securities activities, and not by less drastic forms
of regulation.
Dale, supra note 17, at 220-22 1. Thus, while in the United States and Japan, banks
were, as a rule, not allowed to engage in insurance or securities underwriting, in
most European jurisdictions such cross-sectoral operations were permitted. The
separation of banking and insurance/securities was originally conceived of as a regulatory strategy to ensure the soundness of banks and to avoid the development of
anticompetitive practices. After the 1929 U.S. stock market crash, there was a widespread belief that the securities activities of banks were responsible for the wave of
bank failures. See Edward J. Perkins, The Divorce of Commercial and Investment
Banking: A. History, 88 BANKING L. J. 483, 499-500 (1971). In this context, the
holding company structure came to provide a way to get around separation. As
groups became increasingly diversified, the regulatory techniques used to regulate
them were progressively modified, going from approaches imposing mostly negative
obligations, such as activities restrictions, to approaches involving affirmative "enhanced" obligations at the financial holding company level, seeking in particular to
pass on to parents the financial burden in case of insolvency of their subsidiaries.
See Jackson, Expanding Obligations, supra note 26, at 510-11. The introduction of
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999 suppressed, however, most of what remained
from the separation strategy, allowing U.S. groups to operate simultaneously
through subsidiaries in the banking, insurance and securities sectors.
68. Capital Adequacy Directive, Council Directive 93/6, 1993 O.J. (L141) I
(EEC) [hereinafter Capital Adequacy Directive].
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remove the competitive advantages investment bank groups have enjoyed so far and establish a level-playing field more favorable to
European groups. This is all the more so if one takes into account the
high degree of concentration of the investment bank industry. 69 The
response of the SEC to the Financial Conglomerates Directive, namely
the adoption of two new regulatory frameworks applicable to investment bank groups,7 ° points in the same direction. The advantageous
capital requirements offered to large investment bank groups can, in
this context, be analyzed as an "uncovered" policy striking a careful
balance between prudential and competitive considerations. As such,
this response seems less disruptive than the alternative of harmonizing
the rules while covertly adjusting the level of enforcement.
This point will become clearer when this article discusses in more
detail the current developments in the European Union, the United
States, and Switzerland. Suffice it for now to emphasize that the regulation of financial groups rests on considerations that do not necessarily converge. The prudential and competition rationales are, at the
margin, in conflict with each other, and the overall environment in
which financial groups operate may vary widely across countries.
69. Although this high degree of concentration is well established, little empirical research exists on the specific effects it may have on competition. According
to the aforementioned Group of Ten Report on Consolidation in the FinancialSector:

On balance, evidence suggests that investment banks may be exerting
some degree of market power. Moreover, the importance of reputation
and the placing power of underwriters may create a barrier to entry that is
likely to survive even the technological developments foreseeable in the
near future. Therefore, in-market consolidation among large firms could
affect negatively their consumers.
The investment banking industry is highly internationalized, as the largest firms are chartered in many different countries. However, the market
is highly concentrated: a small group of firms dominates each segment.
For example, the market share of equity underwriting of the five largest
firms is above [fifty percent] both in the [United States] and Europe.
Nonetheless there is little research available on the degree of competition
in the investment banking sector.
In Italy, a thorough examination by the antitrust authorities concluded
that, even though the market for investment banking was dominated by a
small number of firms, there was no evidence of abuses. In contrast, studies of U.S. securities markets found evidence of anticompetitive pricing
and procompetitive effects of entry.
Group of Ten, supra note 41, at 25.
70. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
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This represents a huge challenge for legislatures and regulatory agencies, which are forced to balance these competing considerations. As
discussed in the next section, the use of equivalence as the underlying
approach towards integration in the regulation of financial groups has
provided rule-makers with larger room for striking a balance which so
far seems not only politically sensible but also economically satisfactory.
II. THE CURRENT REGULATION OF FINANCIAL GROUPS
A. GeneralRemarks
In the preceding section this article discussed the issues that arise
in the context of harmonization and equivalence as regading rationales
and techniques for the regulation of financial groups. Drawing upon
these theoretical considerations, the present section analyzes the concrete mechanisms that have been set up in three specific jurisdictions,
namely the European Union, the United States, and Switzerland, to
achieve equivalence. The choice of this particular "sample" of regulatory regimes follows from the fact that the European Financial Conglomerates Committee and the Banking Advisory Committee have
only provided "general guidance" with respect to the United States
and Switzerland. 1 The reason for this is probably that the main thirdcountry-regulated financial groups operating in the European Union
are based either in the United States or in Switzerland.72
71. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
72. According to statistics available from the Bankscope database, in 2004
among the twenty-five largest banking groups in terms of market capitalization, only
eleven were based in E.U. countries. The other fourteen were based either in the
United States, Japan or Switzerland. The picture does not differ much if we consider the top twenty-five banking groups by total assets in 2004. The most relevant
difference for this discussion is the inclusion of the People's Bank of China at
twenty-second place. One must however take into account that some of these
groups may not qualify as financial conglomerates within the meaning given by the
Financial Conglomerates Directive. For instance, ABN AMRO Holding NV, which
ranks first in terms of total assets, has not been identified in the list prepared by the
Mixed Technical Group on the Supervision of Financial Conglomerates. E.U. Financial Conglomerate Commission, Sub-Comm. on the Supervision of Fin. Conglomerates, Mixed Technical Group, Implementation of Directive 2002/87/EC - the
FinancialConglomerates Directive: Identification offinancial conglomerates (July
29, 2005). Moreover, they may also vary as to their involvement in the European
Union. In any case, this gives a very rough picture of what "third regulators" may
come into play.
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The section is structured into three parts. The first part deals with
the changes undergone by each of the three jurisdictions with respect
to financial conglomerates. In order to examine the extent to which
equivalence has been the true engine of convergence in this field, particular emphasis is given to the interactions between the different
regulatory initiatives. The second part focuses on equivalence in its
narrow sense, and particularly on how the British FSA is currently
handling equivalence determinations. The third part deals with the
specific issue of information exchange among different authorities.
As will be shown, despite some initial reluctance, an apparently satisfactory compromise has been achieved between the two most concerned regulatory authorities, namely the SEC and the British FSA.
B. Recent Developments in the Regulation of Financial
Conglomerates
The Europeanframework-Given the reactive nature of both the
U.S. and Swiss new regulation on Financial Groups, it is useful to
start with a discussion of what they are reacting to, namely the Financial Conglomerates Directive. The Directive can be seen as one step,
among many others, towards a European integrated financial market,73
but it also reflects, more generally, the principles developed by the
Group of Ten Joint Forum on this matter.74 Apart from these very
73. The overall framework was set by the Financial Services Action Plan
(FSAP) adopted by the European Commission on May 11, 1999, itself a result of the
"Lisbon" commitment to make Europe the world's most competitive knowledgebased economy by 2010. Within this framework, there were worries that:
[T]he heightened consolidation in the [financial] industry, and the intensification of links between financial markets call for careful consideration of
structures for containing and supervising institutional and systemic risk, in
particular where they arise in cross-sector groups combining insurance
companies, banks and investment firms ....
The aim of this Directive is
therefore to ensure the stability of European financial markets, to establish
common prudential standards for the supervision of financial conglomerates throughout Europe, and to introduce level playing fields and legal certainty between financial institutions.
Commission Proposalfor a Directive of the European Parliamentand of the Council on the Supplementary Supervision of Credit Institutions,Insurance Undertakings
and Investment Firms in a Financial Conglomerate, at 2, COM (2001) 213 final
(Apr. 24, 2001).
74. The Group of Ten (G-10) Joint Forum is a multilateral regulatory working
group established in 1996. It serves as the umbrella of the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision, the International Organization of Securities Commissions and
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broad remarks, it is difficult to describe the regulatory framework established by the Financial Conglomerates Directive without introducing considerable complexity into the picture. In order to keep the
presentation as clear as possible, it can be helpful to make some distinctions. The first distinction is quite obvious and focuses on the difference between regulatory frameworks and enforcement structures.
The second adopts a different approach distinguishing between a topdown perspective of regulation, which ranges from solo to group-level
supervision, and a functional one, which concentrates instead on the
particular type of activity being regulated. As demonstrated ahead,
the Financial Conglomerates Directive is located respectively at the
highest and broadest extreme. Finally, a third useful distinction can
be drawn between financial conglomerates headed from within the
European Union and those whose headquarters are located in a third
country. This article will analyze the overall framework from the perspective of these three distinctions.
Concerning the first distinction, the underlying idea is fairly obvious: regulatory harmonization through the enactment of directives is
not the same as enforcement convergence. Different states may (and
do) apply harmonized standards in different ways, thus allowing for
some enforcement disparity. To understand the way the system operates in practice, it is important to keep in mind that harmonizing regulatory standards is only a first step towards implementing a harmonized framework. This point will be discussed later.
For now, the focus is on the second distinction mentioned, which
concerns regulatory standards. Three main supervisory layers can be
identified.75 The first is intended to regulate banks, insurance companies and securities firms on a stand alone basis.76 The second layer
the International Association of Insurance Supervisors.
based on the Joint Forum's previous work. See id. at 2.

The Directive is largely

75. See Frank Dierick, The Supervision of Mixed FinancialServices Groups in
Europe, 20 EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES 1, at 48-50

(Aug. 2004) (providing the definition of legal terms); Michael Gruson, Supervision
of FinancialConglomerates in the European Union, 19 J. INT'L BANKING L. & REG.

364 (2004).
76. See Dierick, supra note 75, at 20. The main legal instruments are: the Consolidated Banking Directive (Council Directive 2000/12, 2000 O.J. (L 126) 1 (EC)
(relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions)); Life Assurance Directive (Council Directive 2002/12, 2002 O.J. (L 77) 11 (EC) (concerning
life assurance)); Non-Life Insurance Directive (Council Directive 73/239, 1973 O.J.
(L 228) 3 (EEC) (on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the taking-up and pursuit of the business of direct insurance other
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adopts a group-level or consolidated perspective but remains functionally restricted.77 The Consolidated Banking Directive 8 provides for
consolidated supervision of credit institutions 79 that, alternatively,
have either another credit institution or a financial institution 0 as a
subsidiary or hold a participation of twenty percent or more of the voting capital in such an institution,8 ' or that are subsidiaries of a financial holding company.82 The Capital Adequacy Directive 83 also requires consolidated supervision 84 for groups headed by an investment
firm85 and holding a credit institution, another investment firm or another financial institution or participation therein, or, conversely, for
investment firms whose parent-entity is a financial holding company. 86 The Insurance Groups Directive 87 requires 88 consolidated su-

pervision of those insurance undertakings 89 that own or hold a particithan life insurance)); Investment Services Directive (Council Directive 93/22, 1993
O.J. (L 141) 27 (EEC) (on the investment services in the securities field)).
77. See generally Dierick, supra note 75.
78. Council Directive 2000/12, art. 52(1)-(2), 2000 O.J. (L 126) 1 (EC) [hereinafter Consolidated Banking Directive].
79. See id. art. 1(1) (defining "credit institution" as "an undertaking whose
business is to receive deposits or other repayable funds from the public and to grant
credits for its own account").
80. See id. art. 1(5) (defining "financial institution" as "an undertaking other
than a credit institution, the principal activity of which is to acquire holdings or to
carry on one or more of the activities listed in points 2 to 12 of Annex I," with the
exception of acceptance of deposits and other repayable funds including activities
that are also permitted to an investment firm, but not insurance).
81. See id. art. 1(9).
82. Gruson, supra note 75, at 364 (citing Consolidated Banking Directive, supra note 78, art. 1(21)) (defining "financial holding company" as a "financial institution the subsidiary undertakings of which are either exclusively or mainly credit institutions or financial institutions, at least one of such subsidiaries being a credit
institution, and which is not a mixed financial holding company").
83. Capital Adequacy Directive, supra note 68.
84. Id. art. 7(2)-(3).
85. Council Directive 93/22, art. 1(2), 1993 O.J. (L 141) 1 (EEC). The directive states that an investment firm is any legal person whose regular occupation or
business consists of the provision of investment services for third parties on a professional basis. Id. The investment services covered include the reception, transmission and execution of orders, underwriting and portfolio management. Id.
86. Capital Adequacy Directive, supra note 68, art. 7(2)-(3).
87. Council Directive 98/78, 1998 O.J. (L 288) 1 (EC).
88. Id. art. 2.
89. Id. art. 1(a). Article 1(a) states "insurance undertaking means an
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pation90 or are horizontally linked 9 to another insurance undertaking
(European or not9 2) or a reinsurance undertaking, 93 or, conversely, that
are owned or held by such undertakings or by a mixed-activity insurance holding company.94 Finally, the third regulatory layer concerns
financial conglomerates, namely cross-sectorial groups of a predominantly financial nature, as opposed to mixed-activity groups, which
combine commercial and/or industrial activities with some financial
services. 95 Before going into more detail, this article summarizes
graphically the overall regulatory framework in Europe:

undertaking which has received official authorisation in accordance with article 6 of
Directive 73/239/EEC or article 6 of Directive 79/267/EEC." Id.
90. Id. art. l(f). Article 1(f) states: "participation means participation within the
meaning of Article 17, first sentence, of Directive 78/660/EEC (9) or the holding,
directly or indirectly, of [twenty percent] or more of the voting rights or capital of an
undertaking." Id. (citation omitted).
91. See Gruson, supra note 75, at 365 (explaining that "horizontally linked"
refers to those cases where control is not based on an equity investment but rather on
unified management or cross-membership of governing boards).
92. Council Directive 98/78, art. l(b), 1998 O.J. (L 3301) 1 (EC). Article 1(b)
states: "non-member-country insurance undertaking means an undertaking which
would require authorisation in accordance with Article 6 of Directive 73/239/EEC or
Article 6 of Directive 79/267/EEC if it had its registered office in the Community."
Id.
93. Id. art. 1(c). Article l(c) states: "reinsurance undertaking means an
undertaking, other than an insurance undertaking or a non-member-country
insurance undertaking, the main business of which consists in accepting risks ceded
by an insurance undertaking, a non-member-country insurance undertaking or other
reinsurance undertakings." Id.
94. Id. art. 1(j). Article 1(j) states: "mixed-activity insurance holding company
means a parent undertaking, other than an insurance undertaking, a non-membercountry insurance undertaking, a reinsurance undertaking or an insurance holding
company, which includes at least one insurance undertaking among its subsidiary
undertakings." Id.
95. See generally Dierick, supra note 75, at 20. These groups are merely required to supply the information necessary to regulate their bank or insurance subsidiary. Id. Supervisory obligations are more comprehensive, however, in the case of
mixed-activity insurance holding companies. Id.
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2: LEVELS OF REGULATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 96
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Exhibit 2 illustrates the three levels at which European regulation
intervenes. The thin black line represents an example of solo regulation, focusing here on insurance. The gray line provides an example
of consolidated functional regulation, as is the case of credit institutions or banks. The dotted line is the level at which the Financial
Conglomerates Directive is intended to operate, namely that of groups
active across financial sectors. Finally, mixed-activities groups involving substantial commercial or industrial components are not comprehensively regulated. 97 Whereas this stylized characterization may
be useful to grasp the basic idea, it is important to keep in mind that
the definition of what precisely constitutes a financial conglomerate
subject to supplementary supervision is highly technical and covers,
so far, some sixty groups based in the enlarged European Union, 98 to
96. Adapted from id.
97

Id.

98. See Implementation of Directive 2002/87/EC, supra note 52 (identifying

the financial groups that would fall under the Directive). It must be noted, however,
that this list is by no means definitive. Groups with their head office in Austria, Belgium, France, Finland, Greece, Portugal, and Slovenia have not yet been reported
and, even after one group has been included, the "coordinator" may decide that the
group will be partially or totally exempted from supplementary regulation. More-

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol37/iss1/2

28

Viñuales: The International Regulation of Financial Conglomerates: A Case-S

2006] THE INT'L REGULATION

OF FINANCIAL CONGLOMERATES

29

which we must add many foreign groups operating in Europe and
headed mostly in the United States, Switzerland and Japan. Before
moving onto the third distinction identified above, i.e. between groups
based inside and outside the European Union, it is necessary to characterize the legal concept of "financial conglomerate."
Here, the amalgam so far maintained when speaking of groups or
conglomerates indistinctively must be abandoned. For the purpose of
the Financial Conglomerates Directive, an entity constituting a financial group may not constitute a financial conglomerate. More precisely, the Directive applies only if three conditions are satisfied:9 9 a
"regulated entity is part of a group;"' 00 the "group meets the requirements to be considered as a financial conglomerate;" 10' and the "regulated entity is not partially or totally exempted from supplementary
supervision.' 0 2 Concerning the first condition, at least one regulated
entity, meaning a credit institution, an insurance undertaking, or an
investment firm," 3 must either belong to or be the head of the group in
°4 A group can exist through three types of arrangements,0 5
question.
a parent subsidiary
relationship," the holding of a participation, 07 or

over, a final decision on the identity of supervised financial conglomerates has yet to
be made. Id.
99. Gruson, supra note 75, at 366.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. These entities are characterized by the Directives previously discussed in
this section. To be a regulated entity, an institution must have its head office within
the European Union.
104. Financial Conglomerates Directive, supra note 1, art. 2(14)(a).
105. Gruson, supra note 75, at 366.
106. A parent-subsidiary relationship is characterized by Council Directive
83/349, art. 1, 1983 O.J. (L 193) 1 (EEC) [hereinafter Directive 83/349] to which
articles 2(9) and 2(10) of the Financial Conglomerates Directive refer. However, the
group concept used in this latter Directive may go beyond the one circumscribed by
the former. One such instance would be when supervisory authorities decide to include considering a particular arrangement as a group because of the dominant influence they observe. Moreover, as shown later, the concept of "group" in the Financial Conglomerates Directive also covers the participating interests held either by
the parent or by its subsidiaries as well as horizontal groups. See Dierick, supra
note 75, at 10.
107. As characterized by Council Directive 78/660, art. 17, 1978 O.J. (L 222)
11 (EEC), to which Article 2(11) of the Financial Conglomerates Directive refers.
Financial Conglomerates Directive, supra note 1, art. 2(11). Article 17 states:
For the purposes of this Directive, 'participating interest' shall mean rights
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a horizontal structure. 0 Second, to be a financial conglomerate the
group must further be substantially involved in financial activities."°
The tests for this involvement vary according to whether the group is
headed by an E.U.-regulated entity, as defined above. In all cases the
group must be significantly engaged'" in, on the one hand, insurance
in the capital of other undertakings, whether or not represented by certificates, which, by creating a durable link with those undertakings, are
intended to contribute to the company's activities. The holding of part of
the capital of another company shall be presumed to constitute a
participating interest where it exceeds a percentage fixed by the Member
States which may not exceed [twenty percent].
Council Directive 78/660, art. 17, 1978 O.J. (L 222) 11 (EEC). Article 2(11) of the
Financial Conglomerates Directive adds: "the direct or indirect ownership of [twenty
percent] or more of the voting rights or capital of an undertaking." Financial Conglomerates Directive, supra note 1, art. 2(11).
108. This modality is defined in Council Directive 83/349, art. 12(1), 1983 O.J.
(L 193) 1 (EEC), to which Article 2(12) of the Financial Conglomerates Directive
refers. The existence of a horizontal group is based on contracts or provisions in the
corporate charters implying the unified management of a number of apparently unaffiliated organizations. Alternatively, a high degree of cross-membership in the
boards of different organization may imply the existence of a horizontal group. See
Dierick, supra note 75, at 19.
109. Financial Conglomerates Directive, supra note 1, art. 2(14).
110. The significance test is laid out in Article 3(2)-(3) of the Financial Conglomerates Directive:
2. For the purposes of determining whether activities in different financial
sectors are significant within the meaning of Article 2(14)(e), for each
financial sector the average of the ratio of the balance sheet total of that
financial sector to the balance sheet total of the financial sector entities in
the group and the ratio of the solvency requirements of the same financial
sector to the total solvency requirements of the financial sector entities in
the group should exceed [ten percent].
For the purposes of this Directive, the smallest financial sector in a
financial conglomerate is the sector with the smallest average and the most
important financial sector in a financial conglomerate is the sector with the
highest average. For the purposes of calculating the average and for the
measurement of the smallest and the most important financial sectors, the
banking sector and the investment services sector shall be considered
together.
3. Cross-sectoral activities shall also be presumed to be significant within
the meaning of Article 2(14)(e) if the balance sheet total of the smallest
financial sector in the group exceeds EUR 6 billion. If the group does not
reach the threshold referred to in paragraph 2, the relevant competent
authorities may decide by common agreement not to regard the group as a
financial conglomerate, or not to apply the provisions of Articles 7, 8 or 9,
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activities and, on the other hand, either banking or investment services. In addition to this, however, groups headed by a non-regulated
entity"' do not qualify as financial conglomerates unless their activities "mainly occur in the financial sector,""' 2 which basically means
that the entities of the group involved in financial activities must account for at least forty percent of the balance sheet's total. 113 Qualifying as a financial conglomerate does not necessarily mean that the4
supplementary regulatory framework of the Directive will apply."1
This is where the third condition comes in. Supplementary supervision
directly concerns only certain entities, which are responsible for com-

if they are of the opinion that the inclusion of the group in the scope of this
Directive or the application of such provisions is not necessary or would
be inappropriate or misleading with respect to the objectives of
supplementary supervision.
Id. art. 3(2)-(3).
111. For instance, a group is headed by a non-regulated entity when the parent
company is not subject to regulation in the European Union (e.g. commercial or industrial companies, or a financial institution other than those subject to regulation),
or when the parent company is subject to regulation in a third country (e.g. foreign
financial groups), or in the case of a horizontal group, which has no particular parent
company.
112. Financial Conglomerates Directive, supra note 1, art. 2(14)(c). "[W]here
there is no regulated entity within the meaning of Article 1 at the head of the group,
the group's activities mainly occur in the financial sector within the meaning of
Article 3(1)." Id.
113. Id. art. 3(1).
For the purposes of determining whether the activities of a group mainly
occur in the financial sector, within the meaning of Article 2(14)(c), the
ratio of the balance sheet total of the regulated and non-regulated financial
sector entities in the group to the balance sheet total of the group as a
whole should exceed [forty percent].
Id. The "financial sector entities" that must be considered for this calculation are:
the banking sector, including credit institutions, financial institutions, and ancillary
banking undertakings; the insurance sector, including insurance undertakings,
reinsurance undertakings, and insurance holding companies; the investment services
sector, including investment firms and financial institutions; mixed financial holding
companies; and asset management companies. See Dierick, supra note 75, at 11.
114. Gruson identifies two main cases where the framework does not apply:
E.U.-regulated entities belonging to a financial conglomerate headed by an E.U.regulated entity (article 5(2)(a) a contrario);and E.U.-regulated entities belonging to
a financial conglomerate headed by an entity based outside of the European Union
that is subject to equivalent foreign supervision (article 18(1)). Gruson, supra note
75, at 371.
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pliance by the conglomerate. 1 5 These entities are the following:
every regulated entity which is at the head of a financial
conglomerate;"1 6 every regulated entity, the parent undertaking of
which is a mixed financial holding company with its head office in the
Community;
and every regulated entity linked with another
financial sector entity in such a way as to constitute a horizontal
group.118 Moreover, regulators may extend supplementary supervision
to other entities, totally or partially." 9
Finally, financial
conglomerates whose parent undertakings are located outside of the
European Union and that are not subject to "equivalent"
supervision
•• 120
may also be subject to supplementary supervision.
This latter point
leads to the third distinction identified above, between E.U.-based and
foreign-based financial conglomerates.
This third distinction is particularly relevant to this topic for it lies
at the very core of the equivalence issue. As already pointed out,
foreign financial conglomerates active in the European Union are as a
rule not subject to the supplementary supervisory framework of the
Financial Conglomerates Directive. However, Article 18 paragraph 2
of the Directive states that:
In the absence of equivalent supervision referred to in paragraph 1,
Member States shall apply to the regulated entities, by analogy, the
provisions concerning the supplementary supervision of regulated
entities referred to in Article 5(2). As an alternative, competent
authorities may apply one of the methods set out in paragraph 3.121
Introduced in 2002, this provision raised serious concerns among
foreign financial conglomerates, particularly those based in the United
115. Financial Conglomerates Directive, supra note 1, art. 5(2)(a)-(c).
116. Id. art. 5(2)(a).
117. Id.art. 5(2)(b).
118. Id. art. 5(2)(c).
119. Id.art. 5(4). Article 5(4) states:
Where persons hold participations or capital ties in one or more regulated

entities or exercise significant influence over such entities without holding
a participation or capital ties, other than the cases referred to in paragraphs
2 and 3, the relevant competent authorities shall, by common agreement
and in conformity with national law, determine whether and to what extent
supplementary supervision of the regulated entities is to be carried out, as
if they constitute a financial conglomerate.
Id.
120. See generally id. art. 5.
121. Id. art. 18(2)
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States and Switzerland. These conglomerates were either regulated in
ways not necessarily similar to the European approach or even
unregulated at the group level, as was the case of American
investment bank holding companies. Moreover, the Directive vested
in the "coordinator"'122 considerable powers, including that of taking
into account in its assessment of equivalence the extent to which
standards are actually enforced by foreign regulators. 123 Therefore,
the ramifications of the equivalence issue go beyond the mere
determination of the regulatory standards applicable in other
jurisdictions.
Largely as a response to the ongoing uncertainty, the United
States and Switzerland adopted new regulatory frameworks and
entered into negotiations with the different concerned European
agencies in order to have this problem solved as soon as possible. r24 A
number of guidelines were issued both at the European and national
levels. 15
However, a preliminary step to understanding the
ramifications of the equivalence issue is to ask whether the most
concerned countries have in place an adequate group-level regulatory
framework. The analysis of the equivalence issue can therefore not be
undertaken without first reviewing these reactions.
The U.S. regulatory reaction-The supervisory framework
dealing with financial groups in the United States has considerably
changed in the last decade. As demonstrated before, banking,
securities, and insurance activities were traditionally segregated in the
United States. With the passing of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
(GLBA) in 1999, this segregation was reduced so as to have almost no
effect for those groups meeting the necessary requirements to qualify
as financial holding companies, pursuant to section 1843(1) of the
Bank Holding Company Act (BHCA). 126 This new organizational
122. Id. art. 11(1)(c). See generally id.art. 10 (appointment of and criteria for
selecting the coordinator).
123. Id. art. 11.

124. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
125. Id.
126. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(1) (2000). Section 1843(1) states:
Conditions for engaging in expanded financial activities: (1) In general: ... a
bank holding company may not engage in any activity, or directly or indirectly
acquire or retain shares of any company engaged in any activity, under subsection (k), (n), or (o) (particularly expanded powers), other than activities permissible for any bank holding company under subsection (c)(8), unless: (A) all
of the depositary institution subsidiaries of the bank holding company are well
capitalized; (B) all of the depositary institution subsidiaries of the bank hold-
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structure does not replace the previous bank holding company
structure, which remains available.
It is only an additional regime
offered to those groups that are doing particularly well in terms of
capital and management. 28 Under the BHCA, responsibility for group
supervision is vested exclusively in the Federal Reserve Board. 9 In
June 2004, however, the SEC introduced two regulatory regimes that
coexist with the organizational structures established by the BHCA.
This article will now discuss these two regimes in more detail.
In October 2003, the SEC published two proposed rules and
requested comments about them until February 2004.130
These
proposals concerned the establishment of a supervised investment
bank holding company (SIBHC) structure,' and the introduction of
ing company are well managed; and (C) the bank holding company has filed
with the Board: (i) a declaration that the company elects to be a financial holding company to engage in activities or acquire and retain shares of a company
that were not permissible for a bank holding company to engage in or acquire
before the enactment of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act; and (ii) a certification
that the company meets the requirements of subparagraphs (A) and (B).
127. Id.
128. This structure is also offered to those groups doing particularly well with
obligations such as those found in Community Reinvestment Act. See 12
U.S.C. § 1843(l)(2) (2000). This act allows "the appropriate Federal banking
agency" to:
[P]rohibit a financial holding company or any insured depository institution from: (A) commencing any new activity under subsection (k) or (n) of
this section, section 5136A of the Revised Statutes of the United States, or
sections 46(a) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act; or (B) directly or indirectly acquiring control of a company engaged in any activity under subsection (k) or (n) of this section, section 5136A(a) of the Revised Statutes
of the United States, or section 46(a) of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Act ... if any insured depository institution subsidiary of such financial
holding company, or the insured depository institution or any of its insured depository institution affiliates, has received in its most recent examination under the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, a rating of
less than "satisfactory record of meeting community credit needs."
Id.
129. See generally 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (2000).
130. See Supervised Investment Bank Holding Companies, 68 Fed. Reg.
62,910 (proposed Nov. 6, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240); Alternative
Net Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers That Are Part of Consolidated Supervised Entities, 68 Fed. Reg. 62,872 (proposed Nov. 6, 2003) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pt. 240).
131.
Supervised Investment Bank Holding Companies, 68 Fed. Reg. 62,910
(proposed Nov. 6, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
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alternative net capital requirements for broker-dealers that would be
part of a new structure called "Consolidated Supervised Entities"
(CSEs).3 2 In both cases, the SEC acknowledged that these proposals
responded to the Financial Conglomerates Directive and the necessity
of equivalent supervision to minimize duplicative regulatory
burdens. 13 3 Whereas both proposals received comments, private
companies and representative organizations showed substantially
more interest in the proposed CSE rule. 3 4 The major concern was that
of banking groups which were already subject to supervision by the
Federal Reserve Board, and which feared duplicative regulation by the
SEC. At the same time, these groups expressed interest in benefiting
from the considerable capital relief at the broker-dealer level
contemplated by the proposed rule.'35 The SEC took these concerns
132. Alternative Net Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers That Are Part
of Consolidated Supervised Entities, 68 Fed. Reg. 62,872 (proposed Nov. 6, 2003)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
133. Supervised Investment Bank Holding Companies, 68 Fed. Reg. 62,911
nn.3 & 9; Alternative Net Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers That Are Part of
Consolidated Supervised Entities, 68 Fed. Reg. 62,874 nn. 12-13.
134. The CSE proposed rule received twenty-six comments, while the SIBHC
proposal received only five. See Comments on Proposed Rule: Alternative Net Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers That Are Part of Consolidated Supervised Entities [Release Nos. 34-48690; File No. S7-21-03] (Mar. 26, 2004), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s72103.shtml; Comments on Proposed Rule: Supervised Investment Bank Holding Companies [Release Nos. 34-48694; File No.
S7-22-03] (Mar. 22, 2004),
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed
/s72203.shtml.
135. For instance, J.P. Morgan Chase commented:
The Final Rule should avoid duplicative regulation of holding company
groups that are already subject to consolidated supervision by a recognized
consolidated company supervisor ....

In no event should the Commission

require a Financial Holding Company or any of its affiliates (other than
broker-dealers and investment advisers already subject to the jurisdiction
of the Commission) to consent to group-wide or individual supervision, or
subject themselves to examination, by the Commission.
J.P. Morgan Chase added later:
[T]he Proposed Rule is attractive to firms such as [J.P. Morgan Chase]
only because the alternative capital calculation results in significant capital
relief at the broker-dealer level. Unfortunately, a number of aspects of the
Proposed Rule involve duplicative regulation for Financial Holding Companies and their affiliates which outweigh the benefit of such capital relief.
Comments of Marjorie E. Gross, Managing Director and Associate General Counsel, J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., Proposed Rule Regarding Alternative Net Capital
Requirements for Broker-Dealers that Are Part of Consolidated Supervised Entities
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very seriously when drafting the final rules, which were eventually
published in June 2004.136 In particular, the SEC explicitly considered
the situation of "ultimate holding companies that have a principal
regulator," an expression covering financial holding companies under
the GLBA, and granted exemptions from some requirements and
reductions in others. 37 Before going into more detail, it is worth
noting that this problem provides an interesting illustration of the
different ramifications of the equivalence issue. As the SEC proposals
suggest, and despite the considerable pains the SEC took not to
challenge the supervisory authority of the Federal Reserve Board,
these ramifications can easily develop into domestic regulatory
rivaky.
Section 231 of the GLBA modified section 17 of the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934 to allow for voluntary regulation of brokerdealer holding companies.' 38 While this amendment intervened prior

(Feb. 12, 2004), available at http:/www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s72103/jpmorgan
chase021204.htm. More generally Beth L. Climo of the American Bankers Association Securities Association commented:
As a general matter, [the American Bankers Association Security Association] strongly supports the animating principle of the Proposed Rule; the
availability of the benefits of the proposed alternative capital treatment to
broker-dealers owned by bank holding companies; and the general recognition that, because of the nature of their regulation, bank holding companies should not be subject to all of the same regulatory requirements as unregulated affiliates of broker-dealers. Nevertheless, our members remain
very concerned that the Proposed Rule does not go far enough to recognize the existing regulation already applicable to bank holding companies
through their consolidated examination, reporting, capital, and risk management requirements-all of which are applicable to bank holding companies under the Federal Reserve's regulations implementing the Basel regime that the Proposed Rule appropriately recognizes as its model.
Letter from Beth L.Climo, Executive Director of the American Bankers Association
Security Association, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary of the Securities Exchange
Comission (Feb. 4, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/
s72103/abasa020404.htm. Given the high level of minimum capital required to
qualify for the CSE proposed rule (1 billion U.S. dollars), only very large banking
groups such as J.P. Morgan Chase, Citigroup, Bank of America, Deutsche Bank,
UBS and Credit Suisse are really concerned by this tension.
136. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 200-240 (2006).
137. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(c)(13)(ii) (2006).
138. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 231(a), 113 Stat. 1338,
1402-1406 (1999) (amending the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, § 17 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78q (2006))).
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to the enactment of the Financial Conglomerates Directive, the
Directive played, as already mentioned, an important role in the
subsequent implementation of section 17 by the SEC. The basic idea
of the SIBHC framework is to provide IBHCs that meet some
eligibility requirements with the possibility of being regulated by the
SEC in a way hopefully equivalent to what the Financial
Conglomerates Directive requires,139 thus escaping duplicative
regulation as a result of their activities in Europe. The overall
architecture of the regulation rests on three main elements: a voluntary
application or "notice of intention" to be supervised by the SEC as an
SIBHC, 14 a number of eligibility requirements, 14 1 and a number of
regulatory requirements. 14 2 Concerning the first element, the SEC
emphasizes the voluntary character of the supervisory framework.
Rule 17i-2(a) uses the word "may" to characterize the move towards
supervision, 43 and rule 17i-3(a) uses this same word with regard to the
possibility of withdrawing from supervison as an SIBHC. 14 This
notice shall include a number of items enumerated in rule 17i-2(b).
As this list makes clear, for an IBHC to apply to the SIBHC several
eligibility requirements must be met, which lead to the second
element. In order to be eligible, an IBHC must own or control a
broker or dealer 45 "that has substantial presence in the securities
business, which may be demonstrated by a showing that the broker or
dealer maintains tentative net capital of $100 million or more. ' 146
Moreover, the IBHC applying for supervision must not be any of the
following: an affiliate of an insured bank or a savings association,
with some exceptions; 47 a foreign bank or company; 48 or a foreign
139.

See 17 C.F.R. § 240.17i-1-17i-8 (2006).

140. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17i-2(a) (2006); 17 C.F.R. § 240.17i-3(a) (2006).
141. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17i-2(d)(2)(i)(B) (2006); 17 C.F.R. § 240.17i-2(a) (2006).
142. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17i-4 (2006); 17 C.F.R. § 240.17i-5 (2006).
143. Rule 17i-2(a) states: "An investment bank holding company ... may file
with the Commission a written notice of intention to become supervised by the
Commission pursuant to section 17(i) of the Act .... " 17 C.F.R. § 240.17i-2(a)
(2006) (emphasis added) (the Act refers to 15 U.S.C. § 78q(i) (2000)).
144. Rule 17i-3(a) states: "A supervised investment bank holding company
may withdraw from supervision by the Commission as a supervised investment bank
holding company by filing a notice of withdrawal with the Commission." 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.17i-3(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
145. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17i-2(a) (2006).
146. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17i-2(d)(2)(i)(B) (2006). As shown later, this constitutes
an important difference from the requirements set by the CSE regulation.
147. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17i-2(a)(1) (2006) (exempting "[a]n affiliate of an in-
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bank controlling a corporation chartered in the United States for the
purpose of engaging in foreign banking. 49 Under such conditions, an
IBHC may become an SIBHC and thereby be subject to a number of
regulatory requirements with regard to its group-wide internal risk
management control system,150 recordkeeping 5' and periodic
reporting,' 52 including reporting of consolidated computations of
allowable capital and risk allowances consistent with the Basel
Committee's standards. 53 Overall, the SIBHC regulation is less
demanding in terms of who can benefit from it than the CSE
regulation to which this article now turns.
The very core of the CSE regulation consists of a trade-off
between an attractive way to compute net capital requirements at the
level of a group's broker-dealer affiliates, and acceptance of
consolidated supervision as a condition to benefit from the capital
computation rules. The CSE proposed rule attracted much more
attention than the SIBHC rule, which put considerable pressure on the
SEC to modify its original proposal. Among the main challenges
faced by the SEC was the extent to which the more favorable net
capital requirements would be available for companies other than the
largest ones. 154 The solution retained by the SEC stuck to the
underlying rationale of reducing regulatory costs by "allowing very
highly capitalized firms that have developed robust internal risk
management practices to use those risk management practices, such as
mathematical risk measurement models, for regulatory purposes." '
sured bank (other than an institution described in paragraph (D), (F), or (G) of section 2(c)(2), or held under section 4(f), of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956)
(12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(2)(D), (F), or (G) and 12 U.S.C. § 1843(f)) or a savings association") Id.
148. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17i-2(a)(2) (2006) states "[a] foreign bank, foreign company, or company that is described in section 8(a) of the International Banking Act
of 1978 (12 U.S.C. 3106(a))." Id.
149. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17i-2(a)(3) (2006) excludes "[a] foreign bank that controls, directly or indirectly, a corporation chartered under section 25A of the Federal
Reserve Act (12 U.S.C. 611)." Id.
150. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17i-4 (2006).
151. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17i-5 (2006).
152. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17i-6 (2006).
153. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17i-6(a)(1)(i) (2006).
154. See 69 Fed. Reg. 34,428 (June 21, 2004) introduction.

155. Alternative Net Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers That Are Part of
Consolidated Supervised Entities, 69 Fed. Reg. 34,428 (June 21, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 200 and 240).
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As with the SIBHC regulation, one can pin down the CSE regulation's
architecture to three main elements: a voluntary application
procedure, 156 an alternative method of computing deductions to net
capital for certain broker-dealers, 157 and the acceptance of
consolidated regulatory oversight by the SEC, with some
exceptions. 58 The first element presents no complexity so it will not60
be discussed further. 5 9 The second element is much more complex.
The basic idea behind this alternative computation method is that
using in-house market and credit risk models will probably result in
lower reductions to net capital than using the standard net capital
rule. 161 In short, groups with broker-dealers affiliates will incur in
"capital gains" overall because their capital requirements at the
broker-dealer level will be lower. 162 However, paragraph (a)(7)(i) of
Rule 15c3-1 sets the minimun bar higher than what most brokerdealers would be able to attain. Indeed, a broker or dealer that has
been approved to calculate its net capital under Appendix E must, in
particular "[a]t all times maintain tentative net capital of no less than
$1 billion and net capital of not less than $500 million."' 63 Third,
156.
157.
158.
159.

17
17
17
17

C.F.R. §
C.F.R. §
C.F.R. §
C.F.R. §

240.15c3-le(a) (2006).
240.15c3-le (2006).
240.15c3-lg(a-d) (2006).
240.15c3-le(a) (2006). "A broker or dealer may apply to the

Commission for authorization to compute deductions for a market risk pursuant to
this Appendix E in lieu of computing deductions pursuant to §§ 240.15c3-1(c)(2)(vi)
and (c)(2)(vii) ....
" Id. Subparagraph (1) of 15c3-1e(a) lists the items that must be
submitted with the application, which, as in the SIBHC framework, may operate as
eligibility requirements. Id.
160. The detail of this alternative methodology is given in deductions for market and credit risk for certain brokers or dealers, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-le (2006).
161. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-le (2006) preliminary note.
162. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-le (2006).
163. Alternative Net Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers That Are Part of
Consolidated Supervised Entities, 69 Fed. Reg. 34,428 (June 21, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 200 and 240). This requirement was upheld despite a number of
comments submitted during the consultation period asking for a lower threshold:
One commenter stated that we should permit a broker-dealer with tentative
net capital of less than $1 billion to use the alternative net capital computation if it is an affiliate of an international bank with consolidated capital
of over $1 billion. Another commenter asserted that "the Commission
should permit other broker-dealers in the CSE group-wide affiliate structure" to use the alternative method of computing net capital even if those
broker-dealers do not meet the minimum capital levels. These comments,
however, do not take into account certain regulatory and bankruptcy con-
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alternative capital computation comes at the price of submitting to
consolidated regulation of the group including requirements for the
computation of allowable capital and risk allowances,164 as well as
reporting 65 and recordkeeping1 66 requirements. Broadly speaking,
these requirements involve providing information about the financial
and operational condition of the ultimate holding company, complying
with rules regarding the implementation and documentation of a
comprehensive group-wide risk management system, consenting to
SEC examination of the ultimate holding company and its material
affiliates, and reporting monthly group-wide allowable capital and
allowances for market,
credit, and operational risk in accordance with
67
the Basel standards.1
As shown before, this condition raised great concern from those
holding companies that, while owning broker-dealers, were already
subject to comprehensive consolidated supervision, as well as, more
generally, from highly supervised companies belonging to groups
including broker-dealers. This was particularly the case of the new
Qualified Financial Holding Companies established under the GLBA.
The CSE regulation thoroughly addressed this issue by imposing more
limited commitments 68 on entities that have a principal regulator' 69
and ultimate holding companies under the Bank Holding Company
Act. 7' Despite these guarantees, only five institutions have so far

siderations.
Id. at 34,430-31.
164. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-lg(a) (2006).
165. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-lg(b) (2006).
166. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-lg(c)-(d) (2006).
167. As noted by one commentator "[t]his effectively extends the Basel II provisions through the back door to the big five U.S. investment banks, in addition to
the roughly [twenty] commercial banks to which the new capital adequacy accord [is
supposed to] apply in America." US Investment Firms March to the Basel II Drum,
GLOBAL
RISK
REGULATOR
NEWSLETTER,
Apr.,
2004,
available at
http://www.globalriskregulator.com/archive/April2004-07.html.
168. Broadly speaking, the SEC "will not examine any entity that has a principal regulator and

. . .

will use the reports that it files with its principal regulator for

our regulatory purposes, to the greatest extent possible." Alternative Net Capital
Requirements for Broker-Dealers that Are Part of Consolidated Supervised Entities,
69 Fed. Reg. 34,428, 34,431 (June 21, 2004).
169. See 17 C.F.R. §240.15c3-1(c)(13)(i) (2006). This type of entity includes
insured depository institutions, futures commission merchants, entities licensed by a
State insurance regulator and certain foreign banks. Id.
170. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(c)(13)(ii) (2006). This category includes any
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72
7
opted for CSE status, namely Merrill Lynch, ' Goldman Sachs,1
Morgan Stanley, 173 Lehman Brothers, 7 4 and Bear Steams. 175
The two frameworks reviewed represent, with the already existing
financial holding company regime, the main responses the United
States can use to deal with the requirements imposed by the Financial
Conglomerates Directive on third-country groups.
While the
existence of these regimes gives U.S. groups active in Europe a strong
argument to avoid supplementary supervision by a European
regulator, there is no guarantee that they will be considered
"equivalent." In this regard, the political compromises that may arise
out of negotiation within the framework of the E.U.-U.S. Regulatory
Dialogue are as important as the specific contents of a given regime.
The determination of equivalence may operate as a bargaining
resource to achieve other related, though different, concessions from
the counterparty. As shown next, the relations between European and
Swiss regulators offer another good illustration of this point.
The Swiss reaction-InSwitzerland, until very recently, there was
no formal regulation specifically targeting heterogeneous financial
groups. An international briefing on Switzerland rightly noted:
[T]he regulatory concept applicable to heterogeneous financial
conglomerates is that of solo-plus supervision, i.e. the Federal
Banking Commission (FBC) is in charge of supervising the banking side of the conglomerate, and the Federal Insurance Office
(FIO) is called in to supervise the insurance side. The lead regulator (either the FBC or the FIO, depending on the supervised conglomerate) additionally assesses the quality of the conglomerate in
terms of capital adequacy, liquidity, risk, diversification and organ-

financial holding company or company that is treated as such under the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (e.g. foreign bank that has adopted the financial holding
company status). Id.
171. Order Regarding Alternative Net Capital Computation for Merrill Lynch,
Exchange Act Release No. 50,925, 69 Fed. Reg. 78,509-01 (Dec. 23, 2004).
172. Order Regarding Alternative Net Capital Computation for Goldman,
Sachs, Exchange Act Release No. 51,421, 85 SEC Docket 147 (Mar. 23, 2005).
173. Order Regarding Alternative Net Capital Computation for Morgan
Stanley, Exchange Act Release No. 52,145, 70 Fed. Reg. 44,701-01 (July 28, 2005).
174. Order Regarding Alternative Net Capital Computation for Lehman Brothers, Exchange Act Release No. 52,753 70 Fed. Reg. 69,614-01 (Nov. 9, 2005).
175. Order Regarding Alternative Net Capital Computation for Bear Stearns,
Exchange Act Release No. 52,857, 70 Fed. Reg. 72,682-01 (Nov. 30, 2005).
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izational and personnel requirements, in each case on a consolidated basis. 176

To be more precise, the main divide has traditionally been between the
banking and securities sectors, subject to the supervision of the Swiss
Federal Bank Commission (SFBC), and the insurance sector,
supervised by the Federal Office of Private Insurance (FOPI), the
Federal Social Insurance Office (FSIO), and cantonal (state)
regulators. However, the increasing conglomeration between
banking/securities and insurance, as well as external pressure, 177 has
led in recent years to a series of attempts at providing a
comprehensive solution to this development. 78 Among these efforts,
two are particularly relevant to this discussion, namely the enactment
of a federal statute on the supervision of insurance undertakings

176. See Switzerland: Supervision of Financial Conglomerates, INT'L FIN. L.
REv., July 1999, available at http://www.iflr.com/?Page=5&ISS=11973 (follow
"Switzerland-Switzerland" hyperlink located under "International Briefings" section).
177. The 2004 Annual Report of the Swiss Federal Banking Commission notes
the sometimes reluctant tone in which the European Financial Conglomerates Committee and the European Banking Committee describe the absence of a formal legal
base for the regulation of financial conglomerates. The SFBC underlines however
that such reluctance is unjustified, citing as examples its pioneer efforts in regulating
the Credit Suisse Group or the positive relationship it has developed with the British
FSA in recent times. See Rapport de gestion, 2004, pp. 114-15. This article comes
back to this issue later on, focusing on the specific challenges for the exchange of
information. Suffice it to say, for now, that the comments of the SFBC illustrate
how the equivalence issue may be perceived as an instrument to put pressure on the
related, though separate, question of information exchange and banking secrecy.
178. See, e.g., Surveillance intdgrje des marchsfinanciers [Integrated supervision of financial markets], Premier rapport partiel de la Commission d'experts
mise sur pied par le Conseil fdd6ral [First partial report of the expert commission
established by the federal council, Zimmerli Report], July 2003 (Switz.) (including a
preliminary legislative project). Currently, there is an ongoing legislative project on
this matter. Projet de loi f6ddrale sur l'autorit6 f6d6rale de surveillance des marchds
financiers [LFINMA].
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(LSA), 17 9 and the amendments to the federal banking law introduced

thereby. 180
Concerning the first, chapter 6 of the LSA deals specifically with
the supervision of insurance conglomerates, 8 ' authorizing the
"relevant authority" to supervise any conglomerate involving a Swiss
insurance affiliate provided such conglomerate is effectively directed
from within Switzerland or, if directed from outside, when it is not
equivalently supervised.' 82 It is important to note that supervision is
not compulsory but stems rather from a discretionary decision of the
supervisory authority.183 If such authority deems it appropriate, then
the conglomerate will be subject to "supplementary" supervision in
addition to that required at the individual and group level.',, The
contents of this supplementary supervision
include what is called the
'
"guarantee of irreprochable activity,"185
capital requirements, 18 6
internal risk regulation,'87 the requirement of external audit, 188 and a
specific reporting obligation imposed on the governing body or the

179. LSA, supra note 11. For the rationales underlying the enactment of this
Act see generally Message concernant une loi sur la surveillance des entreprises
d'assurance et la modification de la loi fgddrale sur le contrat d'assurance [Message
regarding Statute on the Supervision of Insurance Undertakings and Modification of
the Federal Statute on the Insurance Contract], May 9, 2003, Feuille Fddrale [FF]
03.035 May 9, 2003 (Switz.).
180. FBA, supra note 11, arts. 3b-3h.
181. Article 72 defines an insurance conglomerate as follows: two or more undertakings; including at least one insurance undertaking and either a bank or a securities firm of considerable economic importance; their overall activity being predominantly in the insurance sector; forming an economic unit or linked by means of
control or influence. See also Ordonnance du 9 novembre 2005 sur la surveillance
des entreprises d'assurance priv6es [hereinafter OS], [Ordinance of November 9,
2005 on the Supervision of Private Insurance Undertakings], Nov. 9, 2005, RS
961.011 (Switz.) (regulation implementing the LSA, see Title 8 in particular, dealing
with insurance groups and conglomerates).
182. LSA, supra note 11, art. 73(1)(a) and (b).
183. Article 73(1) states: "The supervisory authority can subject to supervision ....
" (emphasis added).
184. Id. art. 74.
185. Article 75 refers to articles 14 and 22 of the LSA regarding the standards
applicable to the persons in top management and oversight positions. Id. art. 75.
186. Id. art. 77; see also OS, arts. 204 to 206.
187. LSA, supra note 11, art. 76.
188. Id. art. 78.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2006

43

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 37, No. 1 [2006], Art. 2

44

CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 37

legal and physical persons to whom governing authority is
delegated. '8 9
Regarding the regulation of large banking groups such as UBS or
Credit Suisse Group, the LSA has introduced a new framework in the
form of amendments to Articles 3b to 3h of the Federal Banking Act
(FBA). A financial group may be defined by the presence of either a
bank or securities firm within a group of companies forming an
economic entity mainly active in the financial sector. 190 Groups
including at least one insurance company but active mainly in either
banking or securities are considered financial conglomerates
dominated by the corresponding sector.' 9' An entity meeting the
preceding criteria may' 92 be subject to consolidated regulation by the
SFBC if it either holds a bank or a broker-dealer organized under
93
Swiss law or is effectively directed from within Switzerland.
Supervision at the group/conglomerate level is exerted in addition to
that at the regulated entity level.194 Articles 3f to 3h circumscribe the
substance of consolidated supervision. In particular, they delegate
broad powers to the SFBC with respect to capital and liquidity
requirements, internal risk regulation, accounting standards,' 95 audit
requirements 96 and imposing on groups/conglomerates a broad
disclosure obligation' 97 as well as a "guarantee of irreprochable
activity."' 98 Moreover, even before this new framework entered into
force, the SFBC had adopted, in April 2004, Circular No. 04/1 on the
Supervision of Large Banks, 199 setting the modalities in which
189. Id. arts. 79, 47.
190. FBA, supra note 11, art. 3c(l).
191. Id. art. 3c(2).
192. Article 3d paragraph 1 FBA states that "The Banking Commission can
subject ...." (emphasis added). Id. art. 3d(1).
193. Id. art. 3d. Paragraph 2 addresses cases in which foreign regulatory agencies claim jurisdiction to oversee the group.
194. Id. art. 3f. Moreover, according to article 3b of the FBA, "when a bank

intends to operate as part of a financial group or conglomerate, the SFBC can make
the granting of the banking license conditional to the acceptance of consolidated
supervision of the whole group." Id. art. 3b.
195. Id. art. 3g.
196. Id. art. 3h(1)-(2).
197. Id. art. 3h(3).
198. Id. art. 3f(l).
199. See generally CFB 04/1, supra note 11. This article uses an unofficial
translation established by KPMG. There is no comprehensive statutory framework
dealing with the consolidated supervision of banks. However, many provisions of
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oversight was to be conducted. This circular deals in particular with
two supervisory techniques, namely "direct audits" performed by the
SFBC and "in-depth audits" performed by an auditing firm on the
basis of specific instructions by the SFBC. Direct audits allow the
SFBC to reach its own assessment of a particular area of a large bank
or of the banking system as a whole, through repeating the same
procedure for several large banks.2°° Although they are considered as
"independent acts of supervision," duplication of auditing efforts by
the SFBC, auditing firms and internal auditors must be avoided as far
as possible. 0 ' Concerning "in-depth audits," they are carried out by
auditing firms20 2 under a mandate from the SFBC setting the object,
scope and timing of the audit.2" 3 This instrument is, as a rule, used to
assess the risk involved in a particular business area or to develop
recommendations thereupon." 4 The Circular also prescribes a number
of reporting obligations as well as regular contacts with the banking
group, the internal auditors, and the auditing firms concerned.2 5
Overall, this emerging supervisory regime seems to be an
outgrowth of informal regulatory practices conducted until recently by
the relevant authorities, at least as regards the Circular on the
Supervision of Large Banks. From the European point of view, there
had been some reluctance to consider such soft instruments as setting
a strong enough basis for equivalent regulation, an attitude that may
have catalyzed the adoption of the new statutory framework.
However, as is discussed next, the reasons for this reluctance seem to
the Federal Banking Act and its main implementing regulation, Ordonnance du 17
mai 1972 sur les banques et les caisses d'6pargne, deal with different aspects of consolidated supervision. See generally FBA, supra note 11; Ordonnance du 17 mai
1972 sur les banques et les caisses d'6pargne [OB], [Ordinance of May 17, 1972 on
Banks and Savings Banks], May 17, 1972, RS 952.02 (Switz.); Carlo LOMBARDINI,
LE DROIT BANCAIRE SUISSE, [Swiss Banking Law] 21 (2002); Peter Nobel, Bankund Finanzkonglomerate- Eine aufsichtrechtliche Auslegeordnung, in AKTUELLE
RECHTSPROBLEME DES FINANZ- UND BORSENPLATZES SCHWEIZ 171 (2000).

200. CFB 04/1, supra note 11, para. 4.1.
201. Id. para. 4.2.
202. Characterized as "auditors approved by the Banking Commission pursuant to Art. 20 BankL or Art. 18 SESTL." Id. Glossary of Terms A5.

203. The specific term is "audit 6tendu" (Vertiefte Prfifung) to be distinguished
from "audit approfondi"(Schwerpunktpriifung), where the object, scope and timing
of the audit are decided by the auditing company. Id. Glossary of Terms A6 (German/English version).
204. CFB 04/1, supra note 11, para. 5.1.
205. See id. paras. 1-2.
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be related not only to fears as to the actual effectiveness of the system
but to political considerations as well.
C. Determining Equivalence
After the enactment of the Financial Conglomerates Directive,
with its requirement that third-country groups operating in the
European Union be equivalently regulated, one of the most pressing
issues that immediately arose was that of who would be in charge of
determining equivalence. Article 18 paragraph 1 of the Directive
states:
The verification [of equivalence] shall be carried out by the
competent authority which would be the coordinator if the criteria
set out in Article 10(2) were to apply . . . . That competent
authority shall consult the other relevant competent authorities, and
shall take into account any applicable guidance prepared by the
Financial
Conglomerates Committee in accordance with Article
06

21(5).2

The relative uncertainty left by this phrasing was addressed by the
Mixed Technical Group on the Supervision of Financial
Conglomerates in its "Issues Schedule, '' 2°7 albeit not in an entirely
satisfactory way. Item 46 of the Schedule raised the question of
which authority shall verify the equivalence of a third country's
regime: the coordinator or the competent authorities, to which the
Mixed Group answered the following:
The competent authority which would be the coordinator is
responsible for the verification of the equivalence of a third
country's supervisory regime, according to Article 18(1).
Equivalence verification has to be made on a case by case basis for
each group, taking
into account any guidance issued under Article
20

18(1) or 29(1 1).

1

206. Financial Conglomerates Directive, supra note 1,art. 18(1).
207. Mixed Technical Group, Implementation and interpretationof Directive
2002/87/EC, Issues Schedule.
208. Id. item 46.
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While this answer does not extend much further 209 than what is
stated in the relevant provision of the Directive, the idea that
equivalence is to be determined for each group was not apparent from
the provision's wording. One may ask why this is being done on a
group-by-group basis instead of by country or by regulatory
framework. One possible answer would be that, as groups may vary
in terms of the financial activities in which they are engaged, or at
least in the percentage of each activity, as well as in the regulatory
frameworks to which they are subject in their home country,
regulators are trying to take this into consideration in evaluating
equivalence. Moreover, these frameworks may be composed, at least
to some extent, of specific measures such as no-action letters or the
like, which could only be dealt with on a firm-by-firm basis. In other
words, financial conglomerates would be too few and too special to
apply a one-size-fits-all approach. Another possible explanation is
that some equivalence requirements that are not fully satisfied by the
home country regulation could be achieved by negotiation between
the coordinator and the concerned group. 21° This could also be the
case irrespective of any gap in the home country regulatory
framework. Indeed, coordinators may want to negotiate with each
group in order to get information they could hardly access otherwise,
even through the channels of international regulatory cooperaLion. In
this respect, negotiating on an individual basis would provide
regulators with additional barganing power. Still another possible
answer would be that, for political reasons, regulators prefer not to
make open judgements on the overall quality of a foreign regulatory
framework.211
209. Note however that item 47 addressed a far more detailed question with
bearing on this point:
Question: Should activities of third country groups, in or outside the
[European Union], be taken into account for the calculation of ratios and
the identification of the coordinator of E.U. sub-groups of such third country groups?
Answer: For the purposes of identifying the 'coordinator' for a group with
a third country parent: activities outside the [European Union] should not
be taken into account; activities of E.U. branches of these groups should
also not be taken into account; and activities of E.U. subsidiaries should be
taken into account.
Id. item 47.
210. This argument has been suggested by Professor Hal Scott.
211. This argument has been suggested by Professor Howell Jackson. However, one could argue that the Financial Conglomerates Committee is actually doing
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Understandably, at this point all eyes turned to the most affected
regulatory agency in Europe, the FSA, which came under increased
pressure to clarify its position. Between October 2003 and July 2004,
the FSA conducted a consultation process regarding
its
implementation of the Financial Conglomerates Directive.2 2
Respondents included some twenty-seven organizations, some of them
acting confidentially, who raised many different issues. On the
question of third-country groups, three aspects received the lion's
share: the process for determining equivalence; the FSA's policy
towards groups not subject to equivalent supervision; and the
timetable for making these decisions.2 3 In what follows, this section
will deal tour ii tour with each one of these three issues.
Concerning the process for determining equivalence, the FSA
discussed the way it intends to implement the Directive in its
Consultation Paper and Feedback, chapters 7 and 5 respectively.
There is a two-step process going from general assessments of
equivalence, in particular by the European Financial Conglomerates
Committee (EFCC), to the supervisor's own judgement of the foreign
regulatory framework.2 4 As was already mentioned, the EFCC in
conjunction with the Banking Advisory Committee (BAC) have
issued general guidance on the equivalence of the U.S. and Swiss
regulatory frameworks respectively. Overall, the EFCC/BAC
guidance characterizes the two systems with the following identical
phrase: "we are of the view that, on balance, there is broad
equivalence
in
the
[U.S./Swiss]
supervisory
approaches,
notwithstanding the caveats noted below. 2 15 In any case, such
guidance is by no means decisive, for "the final determination must
have regard for the specific supervisory arrangements in place for
each group" 2 16 and needs only to be taken into account by the FSA,

its general determinations on a country basis.

212. See FSA's

CONSULTATION PAPER

204 (Oct. 2003) and the

FEEDBACK TO

CP204 (July 2004). This process resulted in introduction of new rules into the Integrated Prudential Sourcebook (PRU) as well as in amendments or additions to the
various Interim Prudential Sourcebooks (IPRU (BANK), IPRU (BSOC), IPRU
(FSOC), IPRU (INS), IPRU (INV)). For a detailed list of this changes see FSA,
Handbook Notice 35, July 20 2004, paragraphs 2.12 to 2.18.
213.

See FEEDBACK TO CP204, supra note 212, at 31.

214. See CONSULTATION PAPER 204, supra note 212, at 43-44.
215. General Guidance Switzerland, supra note 4, at 3; General Guidance
USA, supra note 4, at 3.
216. FEEDBACK ON CP204, supra note 212, at 32.
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which will reach a final determination "having consulted other
relevant authorities involved in the supervision of the group. "217
In order to make these determinations, the FSA applies four
generic criteria derived from requirements set by the Financial
Conglomerates Directive: (1) qualitative group supervision; (2) quantitative group supervision; (3) supervisory co-operation/information
sharing; and (4) enforcement. Typically, failure to meet the European
standards for any of these criteria should result in a determination of
non-equivalence for the group in question. 2 8 As will be seen later on,

the main source of tension is probably the third criterion, particularly
regarding information sharing among regulatory authorities.
However, one must keep in mind the key difference between
"equivalence" and "harmonization." Equivalence should not be interpreted as requiring the same or even similar standards but rather an
overall satisfactory level of regulation. Indeed, while equivalence
may pursue ultimate goals similar to those sought through harmonization, particularly risk-management and the establishment of an international level playing field, it does not do so by the same means as
harmonization. If equivalence does not entail the sharing of the same
standards, this does not necessarily mean that it is less demanding than
harmonization. One could argue, for instance, that the very fact that
harmonization is limited to standard-setting without due regard for supervisory cooperation and practical enforcement makes equivalence
more difficult to attain for certain countries. 219 After all, the impact of
a particular standard cannot be dissociated from the extent to which it
is actually enforced.
In practice, the FSA has already undertaken a considerable number of equivalence determinations, both concerning the five major
broker-dealers registered with the SEC as Consolidated Supervised
Entities and a number of Financial Holding Companies organized under the GLBA. 22° However, these determinations will remain confidential unless the group itself makes the information public through
other channels, and even in such case, the precise reasoning followed
by the FSA in its determination may remain unavailable. In any case,
217. Id.
218. See generally id.

219. This point will depend on whether harmonization is defined as covering
enforcement levels.
220. Hector Sants, Managing Dir., Wholesale & Inst. Mkts., Keynote Address
at the FSA SHCOG/SIA Cross Borders Conference: Regulatory Cooperation (Nov.

15, 2005).
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two hypotheses are possible. If equivalence is granted, then no new
requirements are imposed on the group. Conversely, if the FSA
reaches a decision of non-equivalence, then it has some leeway as to
the action it can undertake. This leads to the second major issue identified in the consultation process.
The FSA's policy towards groups not subject to equivalent supervision must be assessed against the broad alternatives offered by the
Financial Conglomerates Directive itself.221 Article 18 paragraphs 2
and 3 vest in the coordinator, after consultation with the other relevant
competent authorities, substantial powers in setting the requirements
applying to such a case.22 2 Three remarks are in order here. First, the
requirements can be tailored to suit the specific regulatory needs of a
particular conglomerate.2 2 3 Second, paragraph 3 leaves open the question of the specific methodologies that could be selected. 2 24 This was
one of the questions identified in the aforesaid Issues Schedule established by the Mixed Technical Group with relation to Article 18.225
More precisely, it was emphasized that further reflection on these
"other methods" should not seek to "come up with a restrictive list of
alternative methods. 2 26 The Directive mentions only one such
method, namely the costly establishment of a European-based financial sub-holding company which would fall under the normal regulatory framework set by the Directive.2 27 Other methods could include
applying these same standards by analogy to the third-country-based
entity 228 or using techniques found in sectorial regulations, such as
"ring fencing" for banking groups.2 29 In any case (and this is the third
remark) these alternative methods must achieve the regulatory objectives of the Directive and be notified to both the other competent authorities involved and the European Commission. 23 ° Drawing upon
this general framework, the FSA has stated that its approach will be

221.

222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
however,

Financial Conglomerates Directive, supra note 1, art. 18(1)-(2).

Id.
See id.
Id. art. 18(3).
Mixed Technical Group, supra note 207, item 49.
Id.
See Financial Conglomerates Directive, supra note 1, art. 18(3).
See id. art. 18(2).
Mixed Technical Group, supra note 207, item 49.
See Financial Conglomerates Directive, supra note 1, art. 18(3). It is,
not clear what would be the procedure to verify this latter requirement.
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"proportionate to the risk presented by the group concerned ' 23' and
that any additional measure "will be chosen having regard to the scale,
nature and complexity of each group" as well as "discussed with the
group concerned. 232
As to the applicable timetable, the FSA's plan was to make the
determinations of equivalence for each concerned group before the
start of the 2005 financial year. According to Hector Sants, FSA's
Managing Director for Wholesale and Institutional Markets, more
than 100 determinations had been undertaken as of November 2005.233
But, again, these materials remain confidential. Overall, the absence
of public complaints by major financial groups suggests nevertheless
that the FSA's flexible approach of equivalence is working
satisfactorily.
One may, however, wonder how, in an area
characterized by confidentiality, the many financial entities concerned
can rest assured that they are not being unequally treated. This
approach may create tensions not only among non-equivalently
regulated entities, but also between these entities and those benefitting
from an equivalence determination. In the first case, one can hardly
expect that the FSA will develop an entirely tailored approach for
each group. Most probably, it is applying a discrete set of "other
methods" according to the level of risk associated with each group.
Such an approach, which seems reasonable from a practical point of
view, may introduce some competitive disadvantages for those groups
most heavily regulated. This is all the more so if we acknowledge that
political considerations may have some bearing on the determinations
of equivalence. For instance, whether a particular standard is being or
will be enforced so as to satisfy equivalence will be strongly
influenced by the FSA's perception of the credibility of the regulatory
authorities in a given third country. Moreover, even when such
authorites have a credible record, such as the Swiss SFBC, political
considerations may intervene in the form of linkages, namely the
interrelation of concessions of different nature within the framework
of a negotiation. One may reply that the FSA operates independently
from any specific item in the UK government's agenda. However,
even if we accept this view, one cannot discard the FSA's (or the
SEC's) own agenda. As discussed next, the issue of information
231.
232.
233.
the FSA

FEEDBACK ON CP204, supra note 212, at 333.
Id.
Hector Sants, Managing Dir., Wholesale & Inst. Mkts., Keynote Adress at
SHCOG/SIA Cross Borders Conference: Regulatory Cooperation (Nov. 15,

2005).
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exchange provides a good illustration of the extent to which political
pressures underlie the apparently disinterested cooperation among
regulators in different countries.
D. Equivalence and Information Exchange
Among the challenges that stand in the way of equivalence determinations, trust is probably the most difficult one. Equivalence requires trust at two main levels. First, regulators must trust that the supervisory standards of other countries are stringent enough to
minimize risks. Second, regulators must also trust that such standards
will be adequately enforced. While both assessments are difficult, the
information required to perform the former is of far easier access than
the one necessary to perform the latter. As a matter of fact, knowing
the black letter of the regulatory standards in force in one country is
hardly informative as to the actual bite of such standards in practice.
This requires far more detailed information, which regulators have
traditionally been reluctant to share. In the last three decades, however, a number of crises involving the deficient oversight of internationally active financial groups have persuaded regulators to be more
cooperative among them.2 34 In any case, the very fact that information
exchange is taken into account as part of the third criterion to determine equivalence provides an additional argument for why equivalence may indeed be a more practical strategy for real convergence
than the mere harmonization of standards.
The regulation of financial conglomerates is one of the areas
where international regulatory cooperation has tended to develop in
recent years. However, this is not to say that no obstacles remain. As
Professor Hal Scott points out regarding the negotiations between the
FSA and the SEC over equivalence: "[lt]he more difficult issue
[seems] to be the extent to which European regulators would have access to SEC information about entities regulated in the United
'
States."235
This problem seems more acute with respect to the Swiss
regulatory framework. As stated in the EFCC/BAC general guidance
on Switzerland: "There are a number of features of the Swiss legisla234. For two recent contributions on this issue see, Ethan B. Kapstein, Architects of Stability? International Cooperation among Financial Supervisors, (Bank for
International Settlements, Working Papers No. 199, 2006), and Cornelia Holthausen
and Thomas Ronde, Cooperation in International Banking Supervision, (European
Central Bank, Working Paper series No. 316, 2004).
235. Scott, supra note 8, at 34 (preliminary form).
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tive regime that place constraints on the exchange of information with
non-Swiss supervisors. 236 This may conflict with Recital 14 of the
Financial Conglomerates Directive, which considers that equivalence
can only exist where "third-country supervisory authorities have
agreed to co-operate with the competent authorities concerned on the
means and objectives of exercising supplementary supervision of the
regulated entities of a financial conglomerate. '237 Albeit expected, the
comment was not well received by the SFBC who found it "unjustified," particularly in the light of its positive cooperation with the
FSA. 238 Beyond any regulatory quarrels, the legal framework underlying the extent to which regulatory agencies are authorized to share information with their foreign counterparts is of great importance, not
only for the determination of equivalence but more generally for the
regulation of multinational activities. Whereas the SEC and the FSA
have apparently overcome the main obstacles on this issue, Switzerland may find itself in a more difficult position.
This section will focus on the exchange of information between
the FSA and the two most concerned U.S. regulatory agencies, namely
the Federal Reserve Board and the SEC. In a recent address on regulatory cooperation, Hector Sants, the FSA's Managing Director for
Wholesale and Institutional Markets, suggested that traditionally it
was not the relation with the Federal Reserve Board but that with the
SEC that may have involved some gaps.239

236.

The Federal Reserve

General Guidance Switzerland, supra note 4, at 4.

237. Id. at 1.
238. The cooperation between the FSA and the SFBC is based on two instruments (Exchanges of letters and Memoranda of Understanding) focusing on banking
and securities regulation. Swiss FEDERAL BANKING COMMISSION, RAPPORT DE
GESTION 114-15 (2004).
239. Hector Sants stated:
One long-standing feature of this co-operation is the extent to which we
rely on the work of the Federal Reserve and the OCC in respect of the
various U.S. commercial banks operating in the U.K. When the FSA
authorises an overseas bank branch (e.g. Citibank) it is granting that
authorisation to the whole entity and not just to the U.K. branch. For the
FSA to seek to monitor and supervise every aspect of a U.S. bank's global
operations would be extremely resource intensive quite apart from being
duplicative and raising difficult jurisdictional issues. We therefore work
with the Federal Reserve and OCC to understand the risk profile and
challenges facing U.S. commercial banks operating here and we gain
considerable reassurance from their role as lead regulators for these
entities on a solo and consolidated basis. Our ability to rely on them is
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Board has indeed long developed both informal and formal bases for
the exchange of information with other regulatory agencies, including
regulations implementing the Freedom of Information Act 2" and different soft-instruments.2 4 ' As the primary regulator for Financial
Holding Companies it could therefore express confidence as to the re24 2
suits of the equivalence determinations of the entities subject to it.

The SEC's situation in this particular regard was, until very recently,
quite different,2 43 the main issue being the exchange of information

based on trust built up over a number of years. One traditional gap in our
ability to place reliance on the U.S. authorities has been the fact that the
SEC did not undertake consolidated supervision for the major U.S.
investment banks.
Hector Sants, Managing Director of Wholesale & International Markets, FSA,
Keynote Address on Regulatory Cooperation at the Cross Borders Conference
(Nov. 15, 2005).
240. See 12 C.F.R. § 261 (2006). See also the Federal Reserve Board's letter
on the Frameworkfor FinancialHolding Company Supervision (SR 00-13 (SUP)),
of August 15, 2000 (emphasizing that "[e]ffective financial holding company supervision requires: Strong, cooperative relationships between the Federal Reserve and
primary bank, thrift, and functional regulators and foreign supervisors" and stating
later that "[t]he Federal Reserve is committed to continuing to work in a constructive and cooperative fashion with all regulators involved in overseeing the activities
of FHCs and their bank and nonbank subsidiaries"); Letter from Richard Spillenkothen, Director, Bd. Of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., to The Officer in
Charge of Supervision and Appropriate Supervisory Staff at Each Fed. Res. Bank
and to Fin. Holding Companies SR 00-13 SUP (Aug. 15, 2000).
241. See, e.g., Statement of Cooperation on the Exchange of Information for
the Purposes of Consolidatited Supervision, E.C.-Comptroller of the Currency-Bd.
of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys. (Sept. 17, 1999).
242. Speaking before the Committee on Financial Services of the U.S. House
of Representatives, Governor Susan Schmidt Bies stated: "We fully expect that U.S.
banking organizations will be found to meet the supervision standard of the directive." Susan Schmidt Bies, Member, Bd. of Govenors of the Fed. Res. Sys., Testimony on the U.S.-E.U. regulatory dialogue (May 13, 2004).
243. As the FSA's Managing Director, Michael Foot, noted in speech given in
2003:
The SEC is a Federal regulator like the Federal Reserve but, historically, it
seems to have been slower than its banking colleagues to internationalise.
Also (because of the view it has long taken on consolidated supervision) it
has been less willing to take an "all-in" view of the financial groups it
deals with.
Michael Foot, Managing Director, British Fin. Servs. Auth., The "Weakest Link"Regulatory Co-operation in 2003, Speech at the Guernsey Financial Service
Commission Seminar on International Co-operation and Exchange of Information,
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concerning investment bank groups. However, this obstacle has apparently been eliminated with the signature of Memorandum of Understanding between the SEC and the FSA on March 14, 2006.2' As
suggested by the press communiquis made by the two agencies, this
understanding is to be interpreted as part of the overall efforts to
achieve an equivalent supervision of investment bank groups, particularly of those having opted for CSE status. 245 Thus, the E.U.-U.S.
regulatory dialogue is proving to be an effective device to further financial integration, at least as far as equivalence is concerned. Of
course, the determinations on equivalence being confidential, this is
just a guess, further based on the idea that should equivalence not be
granted to one of the major U.S. financial groups, this would have
hardly gone unnoticed.
(June 5, 2003).
244. Memorandum of Understanding concerning Consultation, Cooperation
and the Exchange of Information Related to Market Oversight and the Supervision
of FinancialServices Firms, Mar. 14, 2006. The overall legal basis governing the
exchange of information by the SEC is Section 24(c) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78x(c) (2006)) and Rule 24c-1 thereon.
245. From the SEC side, Chairman Cox stated that:
The additional tools for information exchange that we will gain from this
arrangement will enhance our mutual ability to oversee the world's largest
securities firms and markets. This arrangement also facilitates the SEC's
new role as a consolidated supervisor of globally active U.S. investment
banks. The information sharing arrangements we are formalizing today
will help insure that the SEC's supervision of these firms is as effective as
possible.
The Director of the SEC's Office of International Affairs, Ethiopis Tafara, also
noted that:
In view of the growing globalization of the world's financial markets and
the proliferation of globally active financial services firms, including large
complex financial conglomerates, establishing and maintaining strong relationships and cooperative efforts with our counterparts in the area of supervision and oversight, in addition to enforcement, is becoming equally
important.
SEC Press Release 2006-36 (Mar. 14, 2006). The remarks of the FSA's Chief Executive, John Tiner, were of a more general nature:
This arrangement builds upon the existing framework for exchanging
information between our two institutions, when this is necessary, as part of
our day to day supervision of firms operating in both the [United States]
and [United Kingdom]. We already work closely with the SEC; this
[memorandum of understanding] will facilitate that process by setting out
the basis on which we will do this.
FSA Press Release (FSA/PN/018/2006) (Mar. 14, 2006).
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Now turning to the case of Switzerland, the situation is considerably more complex. Indeed, despite the existence of a number of soft
instruments on information exchange with the FSA,24 the Federal Reserve Board247 and the SEC,248 the legal framework in Switzerland is
still reluctantly perceived by foreign authorities.249 Swiss regulators
are very much aware of this. In a conference given in June 2002,
Daniel Zuberbihler, the Director of the SFBC's Secretariat, noted indeed that: "the exchange of customer-related information between securities regulators by way of international administrative assistance... is by far the most serious and urgent issue .... It concerns
all banks and securities firms in Switzerland .... -20 Although the

level of co-operation may have increased to some extent, as claimed
by the SFBC in its aforementioned report, the legal framework underlying it remains stringent. These constraints stem from four federal
statutes, namely the Federal Banking Act (FBA),25' the Stock Exchanges and Securities Trading Act (SESTA),252 the Investment Funds
Act (IFA), 253 and the already discussed Act on the Supervision of In246. The SFBC and the FSA maintain soft arrangements, either exchanges of
letters or Memoranda of Understanding, with respect to banking and securities regulation. See http://www.ebk.admin.ch/f/internat/mous.html (last visited Nov. 24,
2006).
247. The SFBC and the Federeal Reserve Board have issued ad hoc declarations concerning on-site visits. See http://www.ebk.admin.ch/f/internat/mous.html
(last visited Nov. 24, 2006).
248. The SFBC and the SEC have exchanged unilateral letters on this issue.
See
Conventions
avec
les
Autorites
de
Surveillance
Etrangeres,
http://www.ebk.admin.ch/f/internat/mous.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2006). According to the SEC staff, there also existed an MOU as of November 2004. The United
States and Switzerland have also concluded a bilateral treaty on mutual legal assistance (MLAT) dated May 25 1973 (RS 0.351.933.6). Treaty on Mutual Assistance
in Criminal Matters with Related Notes, U.S.-Switz., May 25, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 2019.
249. See General Guidance Switzerland, supra note 4, at 4.
250. Daniel Zuberbihler, Director of the Secretariat of the Swiss Federal
Banking Comission, Regulatory Challenges for Swiss Banking Secrecy (June 21,
2002), available at http://www.ebk.adrrin.ch/e/archiv/2002/pdf/neuO5e-02.pdf (last
visited Apr. 10, 2006). In this conference, the speaker also acknowledged that the
legal framework restraining the exchange of information was "fundamentally flawed
and unsuitable for international cooperation in the area of market regulation." Id.
251. See Articles 23 sexies and 23 septies of this Act (Loi fidgrale du 8 novembre 1934 sur les banques et les caisses dipargne, RS 952.0).
252. See Article 38 of this Act (Loifederale du 24 mars 1995 sur les bourses et
le commerce des valeurs mobilieres, RS 954.1) [hereinafter SESTA].
253. See Article 63 of this Act (Loi fedrale du 18 mars 1994 sur les fonds de
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surance Undertakings (LSA).254 Three main conditions must be satisfied for the SFBC to communicate non-public information to a foreign
regulator: 255 the foreign regulator must use the information for the
purposes of overseen banks or other financial intermediaries requiring
authorization (specialty principle); it is subject to official or professional secrecy (confidentiality principle); and retransmission by the
foreign regulator to other authorities is only possible upon prior consent of the SFI3C or if authorized by treaty (long arm principle). In all
events, the information cannot be given to criminal authorities unless
the conditions for mutual assistance in criminal matters are met.256
Moreover, when the information requested relates to particular clients,
these latter institutions must be offered the opportunity to challenge
the decision of the SFBC before the Swiss Federal Court, which has
2 57
admitted the appeals in several cases.
This framework represents a considerable obstacle to international
regulatory cooperation with Switzerland. A good illustration of this
point is provided by a Swiss Federal Court's decision of December 20,
2001258 granting an appeal against an information request by the SEC
in an insider trading case. The court admitted the appeal, stating that
placement, RS 951.31).
254. See Article 81 of this Act (Loif&dirale sur la surveillance des enterprises
d'assurance,RS 961.01, in force since January 1 2006).
255. Article 23 sexies paragraph 2 of the FBA. See LOMBARDINI, supra note
199, at 88-89. The requirements of the Articles 63 IFA and 81 LSA are similar. As
discussed later on, those of Article 38 SESTA have changed.
256. In particular are the condition of dual criminality and some tax exceptions. See Zuberbijhler, supra note 249, at 3.
257. Between 1997 and 2002, twenty-one foreign regulators have submitted
228 information requests concerning approximately 700 clients. The SFBC issued
118 formal decrees of which seventy-three were appealed to the Federal Court,
which partially or fully granted these appeals in thirty-four cases. Conversely, the
SFBC had addressed until that point only fifteen requests to seven different foreign
supervisors. See Zuberbuhler, supra note 250, at 4-5. Apparently, this is peculiar to
Switzerland. See ANNETTE ALTHAUS, AMTSTHILFE UND VOR-ORT-KONTROLLE 79
(2001) (cited in LOMBARDINI, supra note 199, at 714). It is up to the SFBC to decide
whether the information concerns a client or not. In the asset management area the
exchange of information related to clients is even more protected.
258. Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Court] Dec. 20, 2001, Pra. 349
Entscheidungendes Schweizerischen Bundesgerichts [BGE] 2A (Switz.).
See
Zuberbihler, supra note 250, at 5; see also Press Release, SFBC, SFBC Opting for
modification of legislation on granting administrative assistance to foreign regulators of capital markets (Jan. 23, 2002). The case at issue concerned insider trading
before a public take-over bid of ABB for Elsag Bailey. Id.
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the SEC had not offered enough guarantees regarding confidentiality
and specialty, adding nevertheless that the path of international judicial assistance could still be tried. 259 This path, far more cumbersome,
was in fact tried and the SEC's request was eventually granted in
March 2006.26° This leaves a mixed impression as to the extent the
Swiss regime may achieve equivalence in practice. For international
cooperation to be useful, the exchange of information should be operated much faster than it was in this case. On the other hand, Swiss
banks tend to see client confidentiality as one of their major comparative advantages, and the Swiss economy overall heavily depends upon
the international competitiveness of Swiss banks. This cumbersome
procedure has been, in any case, strongly criticized, even by Swiss
regulators. 261 In the aforesaid conference, Daniel Zuberbilher made a
strong case for the amendment of Article 38 SESTA, a case that has
apparently been heard by the law-makers.262
Indeed, the situation seems now to be undergoing some important
changes. In February 2006, an amendment of Article 38 SESTA entered into force, considerably relaxing the conditions under which the
SFBC can grant information requests regarding market oversight.263
In particular, it allows foreign regulators to retransmit the information
to other authorities, including courts using public procedures, without
the SFBC's consent, insofar as the information is used for the implementation of markets and securities regulations. 2 4 This breakthrough
is only relevant in the context of SESTA. The other major articles
constraining the exchange of information, namely Article 23 sexies
FBA and Article 63 IFA, have not undergone any significant change
in the last few years, while Article 81 of the newly enacted LSA has
followed their model. In this context, one may wonder how the
amendment of Article 38 SESTA is related to equivalence. Although
the explicative note proposing this amendment does not refer in particular to the equivalence issue, it suggests that the amendments pro259. Id.
260. See Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Court] Mar. 9, 2006, Pra. 12
Entscheidungendes Schweizerischen Bundesgerichts [BGE] IA (Switz.) (rejecting
an appeal against the decision of the U.S. desk of the Swiss Federal Office of Justice, dated February 13, 2003, granting the SEC's request).
261. See Zuberbihler, supra note 249.
262. Id.
263. See Message concernant la modification de la disposition sur l'assistance
administrative internationale de la Ioi fidirale sur les bourses et le commerce des
valeurs mobilikres, Nov. 10, 2004, FF 2004 6341).
264. SESTA, supra note 252, art. 38(2).
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posed are largely a response to significant foreign pressures to render
the Swiss framework on this specific area compatible with international needs.265 Compatibility does not, of course, mean harmonization. The space between these two concepts is perhaps the "natural
element" of equivalence as a strategy for convergence.266 Swiss national susceptibilities are extremely apparent in matters related to
banking or financial secrecy, 267 and any amendment to the existing
laws requires the consent, at least tacit, of the Swiss people.268 In this
respect, equivalence may be better suited to achieve a compromise
than the less flexible idea of harmonization.
CONCLUDING REMARKS

This study has explored two claims. The first sought to demonstrate that equivalence constitutes in its own right a feasible strategy
for financial integration in the short, medium, and even long run. The
recent developments in the international regulation of financial conglomerates in the European Union, the United States, and Switzerland
suggest that such a strategy is working. The second claim is of a more
hypothetical nature. In this regard, this article only suggests that
equivalence may be a better strategy than harmonization, at least in
some areas. Of course, one cannot draw this conclusion from the
analysis of a single case-study. However, the regulation of financial
conglomerates does raise some of the major issues that efforts towards
transatlantic or international financial integration will need to tackle.
Against this background, this article will briefly come back to the reasons why this hypothetical claim seems reasonable. Three main reasons have been advanced in this respect: that equivalence leaves more
leeway for regulators to reconcile the sometimes competing goals of
prudential oversight and international competitiveness; that equiva265. Id. § 1.5. See generally id. §§1.4.1.-1.4.4.

266. The word "compatible" is expressly used. Id. § 1.5.
267. See Zuberbdihler, supra note 249, at 1. Zuberbtihler's very first words in
his above cited conference were: "I will have to start with a few disclaimers in order
to avoid any misunderstanding before entering into the sacred ground of Swiss banking secrecy from a supervisory perspective" (emphasis added). Id.
268. In Switzerland, federal laws (or amendments thereon) are subject to a facultative referendum. This means, basically, that when people disagree with the
amendment project that has just been approved by the federal legislature there is a
period of time within which they can gather a given number of signatures to request
a referendum on the project. If the number is attained, then the referendum is held
and Swiss citizens vote to approve or reject the project.
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lence better accommodates country specificities; and that equivalence
better takes into account the enforcement dimension of regulation.
The first reason was examined in light of the recent interactions
between the European Union and the United States regarding the supervision of investment bank groups. The detail of these interactions
suggests that considerations of international competitiveness may
have played a substantial role, despite the fact that E.U. policy-makers
mostly referred to prudential considerations. In this context, the
equivalence strategy gave American regulators enough leeway to find
a solution adapted to their own goals and country specificities. Until
very recently, the SEC had not considered it necessary to regulate investment banks at the group level, at least not from a prudential perspective. If it is now doing so, it is largely in response to the Financial
Conglomerates Directive and mostly on the basis of considerations of
international competitiveness. At the same time, the SEC has limited
the impact of the new CSE framework by making it available to only a
very few investment bank groups, the major international players.
From this point of view, the CSE framework can be interpreted as a
balanced compromise between the SEC's own assessment of the
lower prudential risk entailed by investment bank groups, and their international competitiveness. Harmonization would have hardly been
feasible in this regard, given the substantial differences in the regulatory approaches used in the European Union and United States, particularly with respect to prudential oversight. This latter point leads to
the second reason.
Indeed, if the European Union and the United States differ in their
prudential assessment of investment bank groups, it is largely because
regulation in these jurisdictions has followed very different paths. In
most E.U. countries, banking activities were not segregated from the
securities business. "Universal Banks" were active in both sectors.
Conversely, after the 1929 financial crisis, the banking and securities
areas were separated in the United States. Accordingly, the supervisory frameworks applied in each case rested on different goals, which
translated into different regulatory techniques or approaches. This
feature is but one among many other country specificities. Another
possible illustration is provided by the peculiarities surrounding Swiss
banking secrecy and its corollaries in the context of international regulatory cooperation. In this regard, equivalence appears more suited
than harmonization for legislatures and regulators to tailor supervisory
frameworks to the specificities of their countries while ensuring a
minimum prudential level.
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The third reason is closely related to the second. Indeed, if country specificities cannot be fully taken into account by harmonized
regulatory standards, then one may reasonably expect that what was
not incorporated in the black letter law may nevertheless be achieved
by simply applying these standards differently. From this perspective,
a situation in which two different standards are properly applied in
their respective jurisdictions may well yield better overall results than
the same standard unevenly applied. The uncertainty, or even arbitrariness, that could result from this latter situation would make it particularly undesirable. In this context, the fact that adequate enforcement is one of the four criteria of equivalence makes it a more
pragmatic approach than mere harmonization, for which no such component is required.
These three reasons provide a plausible argument for equivalence
to be taken seriously. One could further add that, whatever the relative merits of equivalence compared to harmonization, it is in all
events a safe first step towards convergence, whether as an autonomous strategy or as one preparing the ground for real, as opposed to
formal, harmonization. Although harmonization could also provide,
arguably, such a first step by bending the behavior of economic actors
in certain ways, it is doubtful a whole financial system may be that
docile. At some point reality must be taken into account. In the quest
for financial integration, a leap forward can hardly be accomplished if
regulatory standards are not sufficiently mindful of the realities to be
regulated.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2006

61

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 37, No. 1 [2006], Art. 2

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol37/iss1/2

62

